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Abstract 
This thesis explores climate change attitudes among the Norwegian public. While previous 
research on public opinion on climate change to a large degree has focused on scepticism, this 
thesis focuses on climate change acceptance, belief and support. In addition, previous 
research has included many and various measures of climate change attitudes as one concept. 
I have instead made a division between the aspects that lie closely to the scientific knowledge 
conveyed by the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC), and aspects that to a 
larger degree concern political issues, assuming that we are dealing with two main dimensions 
of climate change attitudes. The aspects that were measured were trend and attribution 
acceptance and overall threat perception for the scientific dimension and personal threat 
perception, efficacy belief, and oil policy support for the political dimension.  
 
The expectation was to find a divide between the scientific dependent variables and the 
political dependent variables. The argument was that those aspects of climate change attitudes 
that lie closer to the scientific findings communicated by the IPCC should be influenced by 
trust in scientists. On the other hand, the aspects of climate change attitudes that are more in 
the political sphere should be influenced by political orientation.  
 
To test this I used logistic regression analysis with individual data from the Norwegian 
Citizen Panel (NCP). The results indicate that there is no clear division between the scientific 
related issues and political issues of climate change. In addition, political orientation is, in 
general, an important predictor of climate change attitudes in Norway. Trust in scientists also 
explains climate change attitudes, though not as much as political orientation. People who 
place themselves to the left on the political scale are more likely to believe in anthropogenic 
climate change, perceiving climate change as a threat, believing something can be done to 
prevent harmful climate changes as well as wanting Norway to decrease oil production. The 
same can be said for people who trust scientists.  
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1 Introduction 
“Climate change at its core embraces both science and society, both knowledge and culture” 
(Hulme, 2013:back cover). 
 
1.1 Climate change and public opinion 
 
While climate change as a scientific phenomenon has been measured for decades, climate 
change research in the social science fields is a relatively new trend still under development. 
Climate change affects everyone and as Bernauer (2013:422) argues it is “caused to a 
substantial degree by humanity (…) and also affects humanity, it raises questions that are of 
great interest to social as well as natural scientists”.  
 
Although scientific evidence of climate change is getting stronger and more manifold by the 
minute, international climate policies have been moving at a slow pace. In 2015, the United 
Nations Climate Change Conference (COP21) will be held in Paris with aim to achieve a 
universal legally binding agreement on climate. According to leading scientists in the latest 
report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) there is a need of 
immediate action if we are to avoid serious consequences. However, climate change 
governance on a global level has almost been at a standstill since the signing of the Kyoto 
protocol in 1997. Therefore, it has been argued that it would be beneficial to change approach 
to bottom-up dynamics and focus more on driving forces such as the public opinion (Bernauer 
2013). Considering politicians tend to highlight policy areas that the people are interested in 
and desire action on, if the general public opinion is concerned about climate change, it 
should be difficult to avoid climate politics.  
 
It has been argued that one of the main issues that need to be tackled regarding climate change 
is making people understand the scope and seriousness of it. If people are sceptical to climate 
change, it is harder to promote and take action. Furthermore, widespread climate change 
scepticism among the public can create strong political and cultural barriers (Engels, Hüther, 
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Schäfer, & Held, 2013:2). In order for people to call for climate change policies they need to 
accept the occurrence and consequences of climate change. 
 
Norway is a peculiar case. The country wants to be a promoter of international climate 
policies, and has large green energy resources (water and wind power). At the same time, 
Norway is highly dependent on the petroleum industry, and a substantial amount of the 
country’s work force is affiliated to this particular industry. A recent debate in the Norwegian 
public forum following the IPCC’s latest reports has brought forward scientists, including 
members of the petroleum science community.  
 
In the majority of the previous research on public opinion on climate change, the focus has 
been on scepticism, which is a contested concept. Another way to look at climate change 
attitudes is to focus on acceptance and policy support. In the existing literature, dimensions of 
climate change are measured without any clear distinction. These dimensions include vast 
aspects that likely can be explained by different (and separate) factors. In this thesis I will 
make a division between aspects that are closely related to scientific knowledge and aspects 
that are more political (oriented). Because these dimensions measure different aspects of 
climate change, it can be expected that they be explained by different factors. 
 
Can climate change attitudes in Norway be explained through a division between aspects 
closely related to scientific knowledge and political aspects?  
 
The aim of the thesis is to analyse different aspects of climate change attitudes in Norway and 
to compare the explanatory power of the factors influencing climate change acceptance. The 
expectation is that attitudes concerning scientific knowledge to a large degree can be 
explained by trust in scientists while attitudes more concerned with political aspects can 
mainly be explained by political orientation.   
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1.2 Justifying the thesis 
In the existing literature on public opinion on climate change there has rarely been made any 
distinction between different aspects. Thus scholars have discussed everything as if it was one 
issue, and this stir has impaired the possibility for cross-country comparisons. This thesis will 
investigate whether distinguishing between different dimensions of climate change attitudes, 
as well as provide for a possible distinction is beneficial.  
 
Most of the research on climate change attitudes has been done on Anglo-Saxon countries1. 
Only a few studies have been conducted on Norway. This thesis will increase the research on 
climate change attitudes in Norway, which differs from the Anglo-Saxon countries to a large 
extent.  
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter two will present the theoretical framework. The chapter is divided in three parts. The 
first part presents the scientific basis of climate change as communicated through the IPCC. In 
the second part the concept of climate change acceptance with its different aspects and 
dimensions will be discussed. The third part of the chapter focuses on factors influencing 
dimensions of climate change acceptance, which I use to form my hypotheses.  
 
In chapter three I discuss the climate change debate in Norway, before presenting and 
discussing the data used in the thesis. In addition, descriptive statistics for the dependent 
variables are presented and discussed. I discuss my methodological choices in chapter four, as 
well as operationalizing the independent variables. Following, I conduct regression models for 
each of the dependent variables and interpret the results individually. In chapter five I discuss 
the results and compare the findings across the dependent variables. The hypotheses formed 
in chapter two are discussed, as well as the general question. I conclude the chapter by 
discussing the implications of my findings and provide suggestions for further research. 
  
                                                
1Anglo-Saxon countries refer to English-speaking nations with similar cultural heritage originating form the 
nations of the British Isles. These countries are also known as the Anglosphere.  
2 Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory suggests that people have an inner drive to hold all attitudes and beliefs 
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2 Theoretical framework 
This chapter will look closer at climate change attitudes, through theoretical contributions and 
previous empirical findings. I have divided the chapter into three parts. The first part looks 
into the scientific knowledge, focusing on reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC).  The second part focuses on the conceptualization of climate change 
attitudes, what it is, which dimensions and distinctions there are, what has been done 
previously in the literature. In addition to that I will also construct and divide climate change 
attitudes in this thesis. The third part concentrates on factors influencing climate change 
attitudes, which factors have been discussed and tested in the previous literature, and which 
explanations I will focus on. The theoretical framework is concluded by forming hypotheses 
explaining climate change attitudes, and discussing expectations for the analysis.  
 
2.1 The scientific basis of climate change  
Before discussing climate change attitudes, it is necessary to understand the problem of 
climate change, and comprehend the scientific knowledge. We need to establish what people 
are or are not accepting. After all, they accept what has become evident through science. 
There is a disproportionate relationship between scientific knowledge and political agreement. 
In the scientific community, there is virtually consensus regarding climate change (Cook et 
al., 2013; Doran & Zimmerman, 2009). Somehow, this is neither being transferred to the 
political nor to the public arena. Some scholars are attempting to change this by highlighting 
the facts that are actually known, proven and agreed upon. Still, in the public opinion on 
climate change research, this is not always done as explicitly. 
 
Climate science plays a fundamental role in the climate change problem (Dryzek, Norgaard, 
& Schlosberg, 2011), and scientists were extremely influential in the original design of the 
climate change problem (Jamieson, 2011). Climate change knowledge has been accumulating 
at high speed, since the discovery of previous ice ages proving that the climate could change 
on its own, and possibly even on a global scale (Steffen, 2011). Scientific proof of 
anthropogenic (human caused) climate change accumulated from the 1970s, although initial 
concerns were raised already in the 1930s (Weart, 2011). Since the 1970s, the perception that 
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unlimited emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) into the atmosphere will lead to significant 
changes in climate conditions, has been embraced by the majority of climate change scientists 
(von Storch, Bunde, & Stehr, 2011). Swedish physical chemist, Svante Arrhenius, first 
suggested the theory in 1896, but it took a long time to gather scientific evidence to support 
this theory (von Storch et al., 2011). In the 1990s, anthropogenic climate change became the 
dominant subject in climate science (von Storch et al., 2011). There is no longer any doubt 
that GHG emissions, mainly carbon dioxide, from burning fossil fuels lies at the heart of the 
climate change problem (Steffen, 2011). These facts are, however, contested in political and 
public debates.  
 
In literature concerning public opinion on climate change, scholars tend to neglect scientific 
knowledge, purely focusing on peoples’ response to it. This may be problematical in different 
ways. Conceptually, because defining climate change acceptance should relate to what we 
actually can know with certainty, and the aspects that are to a degree uncertain in themselves. 
Climate knowledge is by all means affected by uncertainty, even though the development has 
been positive, and the research field is more certain and confident now than at the beginning. 
The development in the assessment reports of the IPCC indicates this, with the first report 
characterized by a higher degree of uncertainty than the newest. However, some degree of 
uncertainty will always be present, as science never can be 100 per cent certain.  
 
2.1.1 The IPCC 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the leading international scientific 
body in the work of assessing climate change. It was established in 1988 by the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) (IPCC, 2014a). The purpose of the panel is to provide the world with a clear 
scientific view on the current state of knowledge in climate change, as well as its potential 
environmental and socio-economic impacts. The IPCC does not itself conduct research, but 
reviews the most recent and relevant scientific, technical and socio-economic information 
worldwide (IPCC, 2014a). Governments take part in reviewing, accepting, adopting and 
approving reports. The authority of the scientific content is acknowledged by endorsing the 
reports. Hence, the work of the organization is “policy-relevant and yet policy-neutral, never 
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policy-prescriptive” (IPCC, 2014a). Thus the IPCC’s task is to produce climate change 
knowledge to help politicians make decisions, without telling them what measures to use.  
 
In 1985, experts gathered to assess recent research, and the first report was published in 1990 
(Weart, 2011). The IPCC was established to let science carry climate politics, as well as to 
curb the activism that grew in the science community (Jamieson, 2011). The assessment 
reports are central to and document the changes. The IPCC gathers scientific knowledge and 
scientists in a broad scope. The reports are authoritative and the foundation for dealing with 
climate change. The IPCC has achieved high recognition and received the Nobel’s Peace 
Prize in 2007 (Jamieson, 2011). 
 
Authority representatives from the 195 member states take part in deciding the content of the 
summaries for policy makers. This has led to criticism against the IPCC, for being driven by 
political interests. However, this criticism mainly comes from communities that wish to cast 
doubt on the integrity and validity of the panel and its conclusions (Bjørnæs 2014). Also, the 
summaries are necessarily built on the main reports, which are not political. Thus, the political 
involvement is limited to selecting what the summaries for policy makers should highlight. 
Summary negotiations are based on consensus, consequently, states can block content from 
political interests (Bjørnæs 2014). Nevertheless, what ends up making the cut should 
accordingly gain high legitimacy after getting past the scrutiny.   
 
2.1.2 The Fifth Assessment Report  
The Fifth IPCC Assessment Report (AR5) was published in 2013 and 2014, and is a revised 
edition of previous reports. The report is divided into four parts, with a summary for policy 
makers for each part. The four parts are The Physical Science Basis (Working Group (WG) I), 
Impacts, Adaptations, and Vulnerability (WG II), Mitigation of Climate Change (WG III), 
and Synthesis Report (summarizing). This is approximately the same structure that has been 
from the start of the IPCC’s work. The most important findings related to understanding and 
accepting climate change will be presented here.  
 
The degree of certainty in the findings builds on evaluations of underlying scientific 
understanding by the authors. It is expressed as a qualitative level of confidence, from very 
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low to very high, and, when possible, probabilistically with a quantified likelihood, from 
exceptionally unlikely to virtually certain. According to the IPCC (2014d:4), confidence in 
the validity builds on the type, amount, quality, and consistency of evidence, as well as the 
degree of agreement. 
 
The first part from WG I to AR5 considers new climate change evidence based on numerous 
independent scientific analyses, from observations of the climate system, paleo climate 
archives, theoretical studies of climate processes, as well as simulations using climate models 
(IPCC, 2013:4). Climate system observations are based on direct measurements and remote 
sensing from satellites and other platforms (IPCC, 2013:4). WG I states that “the atmosphere 
and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, 
and the concentration of greenhouse gases have increased” (IPCC, 2013:4). In addition, 
“(e)ach of the last three decades has been successively warmer at the Earth’s surface than any 
preceding decade since 1850” (IPCC, 2013:5). Concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, 
and nitrous oxide in the atmosphere have increased to levels unprecedented in at least the last 
800 000 years. Since pre-industrial times, carbon dioxide concentrations increased by 40 per 
cent, primarily from fossil fuel emissions and secondarily from net land use change emissions 
(IPCC, 2013:11). The report shows that human influence on the climate system is clear. “This 
is evident from the increasing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, positive 
radiative forcing, observed warming, and understanding of the climate system” (IPCC, 
2013:15). The report states that it is “extremely likely that human influence has been the 
dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century” (IPCC, 2013:17). 
Moreover, “(c)ontinued emissions of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and 
changes in all components of the climate system, limiting climate change will require 
substantial and sustained reductions of greenhouse gas emissions” (IPCC, 2013:19). 
 
WG II assesses impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability of climate change in the second part. 
Patterns of risks and potential benefits shifting due to climate change are evaluated. It also 
considers how impacts and risks related to climate change can be reduced and managed 
through the process of adaptation and mitigation. When discussing impacts and actions 
regarding climate change, adaptation and mitigation are common concepts. Adaptation is 
defined as “(t)he process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects. In human 
systems, adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In 
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some natural systems, human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and 
its effects” (IPCC, 2014c:5). Mitigation is the area of WG III. Vulnerability consists of a 
variety of concepts and elements including sensitivity or susceptibility to harm. Lack of 
capacity to cope and adapt is also a part of the vulnerability term (IPCC, 2014c:5). Impacts 
refer to the effects on natural and human systems. In the report, the term is used primarily 
with regards to the effects of extreme weather and climate events, and of climate change 
(IPCC, 2014c:5). Risk is defined as “(t)he potential for consequences where something of 
value is at stake and where the outcome is uncertain, recognizing the diversity of values”. 
(IPCC, 2014c:5). The term primarily refers to climate change risks in the report.  
 
The IPCC report states that the climate system is interfered by human activity, and climate 
change poses risks for both human and natural systems. Changes in climate have, in recent 
decades, caused impacts on natural and human systems on all continents and across the 
oceans. The report focuses on risk, which is a new contribution. “People and societies may 
perceive or rank risks and potential benefits differently, given diverse values and goals” 
(IPCC, 2014c:3). The reports stated that, at all levels of governance, adaptation planning and 
implementation are contingent on social values, objectives, and risk perceptions. Recognising 
diverse interests, circumstances, social-cultural contexts, and expectations can be beneficial 
for decision-making processes (IPCC, 2014c:26).  
 
In AR5, WG III assesses contributions to literature on the scientific, technological, 
environmental, economic and social aspects of mitigation of climate change. In addition, the 
report assesses mitigation options at different levels of governance and in different economic 
sectors, as well as the societal implications of different mitigation policies, but does not 
recommend any particular option for mitigation (IPCC, 2014d:4). Mitigation is defined as “a 
human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases” (IPCC, 
2014d:4). According to the report, effective mitigation will not be achieved if individual 
agents advance their own interests independently, because “(c)limate change has the 
characteristics of a collective action problem at the global scale” (IPCC, 2014d:5), with a 
common objective. Thus, international cooperation is required to effectively mitigate GHG 
emissions and address other climate change issues, according to the report. Moreover, 
“research and development in support of mitigation creates knowledge spillovers” (IPCC, 
2014d:5).  
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According to the IPCC, “(m)any areas of climate policy-making involve value judgements 
and ethical considerations” (IPCC, 2014d:5). An example is the question of how much 
mitigation is needed to prevent dangerous interference with the climate system, or choices 
among specific policies for mitigation or adaptation. Risk perception influences design of 
climate policy (IPCC, 2014d:5-6). 
 
The report states that “emission growth is expected to persist driven by global population 
growth and economic activities” (IPCC, 2014d:9) if no additional efforts to reduce GHG 
emissions will take place. Without additional mitigation, the baseline scenarios result in 
global mean surface temperature increases between 3.7 and 4.8 degrees in 2100, compared to 
pre-industrial levels (IPCC, 2014d:9). There has been a considerable increase in national and 
sub-national mitigation plans and strategies since the previous assessment report in 2007. 
Since then, cap and trade systems for GHG emissions have been established in a number of 
countries and regions. However, as a result of loose caps or caps that have not proved to be 
constraining, the short-run environmental effect has been limited (IPCC, 2014d:28-29). 
 
The Synthesis Report is the final part of the AR5. It is based on the reports of the three 
Working Groups of the IPCC, and provides an integrated view of climate change. According 
to the report, “(h)uman influence on the climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history” (IPCC, 2014b:1). The impacts on 
human and natural systems have been widespread. Warming of the climate system is reported 
as unequivocal. The atmosphere and ocean have both warmed, the amounts of snow and ice 
have diminished, and sea level has risen (IPCC, 2014b:1). Anthropogenic emissions are 
largely driven by economic and population growth, and are now higher than ever, according 
to the IPCC report.  
 
The report stresses that “(c)ontinued GHG emissions will cause further warming and long-
lasting changes in all components of the climate system” (IPCC, 2014b:8). Accordingly, the 
likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems will 
increase. Limiting climate change requires substantial and sustained reductions in GHG 
emissions. Together with adaptation these actions can limit climate change risks (IPCC, 
2014b:8). Climate change will, according to the report, reinforce existing risks, as well as 
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create new risks for both natural and human systems. “Risks are unevenly distributed and are 
generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of 
development” (IPCC, 2014b:13). Even if anthropogenic GHG emissions are stopped, “(m)any 
aspects of climate change and associated impacts will continue for centuries” (IPCC, 
2014b:16). With increasing magnitude of the warming, “the risks of abrupt or irreversible 
changes also increase” (IPCC, 2014b:16). Adaptation and mitigation are “complementary 
strategies for reducing and managing the risks of climate change” (IPCC, 2014b:17).  
 
The key messages from the report are that human influence on the climate system is clear; the 
more we disrupt our climate, the more we risk severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts; and 
we have the means to limit climate change and build a more prosperous, sustainable future 
(IPCC, 2014b). It is necessary to act and initiate drastic measures to reach the two degrees 
goal, according to the report. In addition, the longer we wait with implementing these 
measures, the more drastic they will have to be (IPCC, 2014b).  
 
2.2 Climate change attitudes 
This part will focus on conceptualizing climate change attitudes. There are many aspects of 
climate change attitudes, and in the previous literature these aspects have been discussed and 
analysed as if it were all one concept. However, I believe that it is appropriate to make a 
division between climate change attitudes that are closely related to scientific knowledge, as 
communicated by the IPCC, and political related perceptions of climate change. The attitudes 
that are related to science can be conceptualized as climate change acceptance, while the 
additional attitudes with a larger distance to science can be viewed as political climate change 
perceptions. The science related aspects of climate change have been the most discussed and 
developed in the field of public opinion on climate change. I base this dimension of climate 
change acceptance on the theoretical framework developed by Rahmstorf. The more 
scientifically distanced dimension has as of yet played a lesser part in the academic discourse. 
This thesis will present the limited existing literature on political related perceptions of 
climate change and attempt to develop this dimension further.  
 
  
 
11 
2.2.1 Climate change 
The IPCC defines climate change as “a change in the state of the climate that can be identified 
by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an 
extended period, typically decades or longer” (IPCC, 2014c:5). Accordingly, the term 
‘climate change’ may refer to changes due to both natural and anthropogenic processes and 
influences. However, the Framework Convention on climate Change (UNFCCC) defines 
climate change differently. The UNFCCC is the main multilateral forum focused on 
addressing climate change (IPCC, 2014d:30). It defines climate change as “a change of 
climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition 
of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over 
comparable time periods”, in its Article 1. Thus, the UNFCCC makes a distinction between 
climate change caused by human activities, and natural caused climate alterations. In this 
thesis, the definition from the IPCC will be used, distinguishing between natural and 
anthropogenic climate change. 
 
In both academia and the public discourse, the terms ‘climate change’ and ‘global warming’ 
are frequently used interchangeably. Global warming refers to the increase in average global 
temperature, and represents only on aspect of climate change. In addition, precipitation, 
extreme weathers and other changes are included in the wider term climate change (EPA, 
2014). According to Hamilton (2011:233), scientists often prefer to discuss ‘climate change’ 
rather than ‘global warming’. This is because the former term better expresses the climate’s 
complexity, variability and extreme events. However, in public discourse, the terms tend to be 
used interchangeably, most commonly ‘global warming’. The use of the latter term may be 
more vulnerable to public scrutiny, as ‘global warming’ might be easier (falsely) dismissed 
when experiencing cold weather extremes. In a study on European’s attitudes towards climate 
change, the impact of the terminological differences is measured. Climate change and global 
warming are experienced as equally serious problems, and the results show that the 
terminology has no significant effect on people’s perceptions in the EU (Eurobarometer, 
2009). In my analysis, I look at climate change in the general aspect, but I discuss previous 
research on global warming in the same aspect as climate change.  
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2.2.2 Dealing with climate change 
Science and research first identified climate change as a problem. Today, however most 
emphasis lies on how it is perceived and received in and of society and authorities (Dryzek et 
al., 2011). Climate change is in first instance a scientific phenomenon, and acceptance is 
therefore a response to scientific facts. Nonetheless, climate change needs to be understood as 
“an idea situated in different cultural contexts” (Hulme, 2013:back cover), as well as a 
physical phenomenon. In Merchants of Doubt, Oreskes and Conway (2010) use a fittingly 
describing analogy to explain the reactions to climate change. 
 
“Imagine a gigantic banquet. Hundreds of millions of people come to eat. They eat and drink 
to their hearts’ content – eating food that is better and more abundant than at the finest tables 
in ancient Athens or Rome, or even in the palaces of medieval Europe. Then, one day, a man 
arrives, wearing a white dinner jacket. He says he is holding the bill. Not surprisingly, the 
diners are in shock. Some begin to deny that this is their bill. Others deny that there even is a 
bill. Still others deny that they partook of the meal. One diner suggests that the man is not 
really a waiter, but is only trying to get attention for himself or to raise money for his own 
projects. Finally, the group concludes that if they simply ignore the waiter, he will go away” 
(Oreskes & Conway, 2010:266). 
 
This extraction highlights the problem of dealing with climate change. Denying that there 
ever was a bill refers to denying that the climate is changing. By denying that the bill is theirs, 
people refuse to accept that climate change is anthropogenic. Denying participation refers to 
the ‘blame game’. Who bears the most responsibility for climate change: our forefathers, 
industrialized countries, or humanity? The suggestion that the messenger is not who he says 
shows the lack of trust in the scientific community, or even conspiracy thoughts. Ignoring the 
waiter and hoping that he will go away points to the inaction that has been taking place.  
 
The literature on public climate change opinion tends to focus on scepticism. Being sceptical 
does not refer to just being cautious to information, but rather not believing or understanding 
the importance, seriousness and scope of climate change. Climate change scepticism 
contributes to prevent action, and is seen as one of the major problems in dealing with climate 
change (Skjetne, 2014). Is it fair to call people sceptical if they simple do not care? Does one 
have to change their lifestyle not to be a sceptic? In that case, the definition would entrap a lot 
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of people and enhance the problematic issue. Is passivity as problematic as working against 
agreement and action? If the term is not defined and conceptualized narrowly and clearly, the 
issue of scepticism among the public will likely be exaggerated. If too loosely termed, all 
scientists can be labelled sceptics due to the degree of uncertainty in science. In addition, 
scepticism is a normative and negatively charged term. Sceptics typically call themselves 
realists. Another question in the conceptual debate is whether there is a division between 
scepticism and denial.  
 
The concept of climate change scepticism has been debated in the literature. Scholars use the 
term differently and apply different attributes to it. This affects how it has been measured, and 
what results are found. The conceptualization is an important step in regards to how to deal 
with the problem (Goertz, 2006). Scepticism is an inherent feature of science and a common 
characteristic of scientists. However, according to Dunlap (2013), many individuals actively 
involved in the denial campaign are not sceptical of climate science but are in full denial, and 
no amount of evidence will convince them of the reality of anthropogenic climate change. 
Without distinctive definition, scepticism is open for interpretation. Other scepticism-
concepts, such as Euro scepticism, have also been highly debated.  
 
To avoid these conceptual pitfalls, I will look at public opinion on climate change from 
another angle, by focusing on acceptance. In this thesis climate change acceptance will be 
seen in relation to the IPCC’s conclusions. The problem of not accepting science is stressed 
by Oreskes and Conway (2010:272): 
 
“The sociologist Michael Smithson has pointed out that all social relations are trust relations. 
We trust other people to do things for us that we can’t or don’t want to do ourselves. Even 
legal contracts involve a degree of trust, because the person involved could always flee to 
Venezuela. If we don’t trust others or don’t want to relinquish control, we can often do things 
for ourselves. We can cook our own food, clean our own homes, do our own taxes, wash our 
own cars, even school our own children. But we cannot do our own sciences.” 
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2.2.3 The climate change acceptance dimension 
Climate change attitudes that relate closely to science are in this thesis placed in a climate 
change acceptance dimension. As most of the conceptual debate on climate change opinion 
has focused on the term scepticism, the conceptualization of the term climate change 
acceptance will build on this debate.  
 
Rahmstorf (2004) finds that scepticism is to loose of a concept, and lists three different sub 
types. Trend sceptics claim that climate change is not happening, that no significant climate 
warming is taking place. Attribution sceptics claim that climate change is real, but not 
anthropogenic. They typically claim that the atmospheric CO2 is released from the ocean by 
natural processes. Impact sceptics claim that climate change is harmless. Rahmstorf’s 
framework has, amongst others, been used to analyse public climate change scepticism in 
Britain (Poortinga, Spence, Whitmarsh, Capstick, & Pidgeon, 2011). Engels et al. (2013) add 
consensus (in climate science) scepticism to Rahmstorf’s multidimensional construct, 
measuring public climate change scepticism in Germany.  
 
In the book States of Denial, Cohen (2013) looks at denial and divides responses to events 
such as genocide into literal denial (it did not take place), interpretive denial (the facts are not 
denied, but given a different meaning) and implicatory denial (it happened, but has nothing to 
do with me/I cannot make a difference). Howe and Leiserowitz (2013) group climate change 
beliefs into concerned, cautious, disengaged, doubtful and dismissive. Ryghaug, Sørensen, 
and Næss (2011) view domestication of climate science knowledge, with four main outcomes: 
the acceptors, the tempered acceptors, the uncertain and the sceptics. This way, acceptance 
and scepticism is part of a graded concept. Public belief in climate change is by Whitmarsh 
(2011) defined as the opposite of scepticism.  
 
In the climate change opinion literature, attitudes toward climate change have been both 
conceptualized and measured differently. By going through studies of public opinion on 
climate change, I have found a variety of dependent variables. Many studies have based their 
measurement on one item, rather than applying more robust multi-dimensional scales. With 
the framework of Rahmstorf in mind, as well as supplements from more recent studies, a 
combination of different attributes of climate change acceptance can be measured. Austgulen 
and Stø (2013) measure climate change scepticism in Norway with twelve different indicators 
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divided in to trend, attribution and impact scepticism. In this thesis climate change acceptance 
will be analysed on these three dimensions, building on Rahmstorf’s framework and 
Austgulen and Stø’s analysis. However, they will be combined into one scientific related 
dimension, in addition to another dimension with measures that to some degree also emerge in 
the literature.  
 
Climate change trend 
The IPCC review showed that there is clear scientific evidence that the climate is changing. 
Trend is usually the first aspect measured in climate change opinion. Table 2.1 presents 
previous research on trend in the literature on climate change attitudes. 
 
Table 2.1: Literature on the trend aspect of climate change 
  
 
Authors 
 
Country 
 
Concept 
 
Question wording 
 
 
Austgulen and Stø 
(2013) 
 
Norway 
 
Climate change 
scepticism 
 
The evidence that the climate is changing is 
trustworthy 
 
I am certain that climate change is occurring  
 
Floods and heat waves do not increase in scope, it is 
just the media who report more on it 
 
We know enough today to say that climate change is 
a problem 
 
 
Donner and McDaniels 
(2013) 
 
 
USA 
 
Belief in global 
warming 
 
Do you believe that the earth is warming? 
 
Engels et al. (2013) 
 
Germany 
 
 
Climate change 
scepticism 
 
 
Climate change is currently occurring 
 
Feldman, Maibach, 
Roser-Renouf, and 
Leiserowitz (2011) 
 
 
USA 
 
Global warming 
acceptance 
 
Global warming certainty 
 
 
Hobson and Niemeyer 
(2012) 
 
 
Australia 
 
Climate change 
scepticism 
 
Is climate change real? 
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Howe and Leiserowitz 
(2013) 
 
USA 
 
Beliefs about 
global warming 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
If you had the opportunity to talk to an expert on 
global warming, which question would you ask? 
Is global warming really happening? Is global 
warming a hoax? How do you know that global 
warming is happening? 
 
Assuming global warming is happening, do you think 
it is…? …none of the above because global warming 
isn’t happening. 
 
Kahan, Jenkins‐Smith, 
and Braman (2011) 
USA Belief in the 
existence of 
scientific 
consensus 
Global temperatures are increasing 
 
Leviston, Walker, and 
Morwinski (2013) 
 
Australia 
 
Opinion on 
climate change 
 
Which of the following statements best describe your 
thoughts on climate change? 
 
I don’t think that climate change is happening 
I have no idea whether climate change is happening 
or not 
 
 
Li, Johnson, and Zaval 
(2011) 
 
 
USA 
Australia 
 
Belief in global 
warming 
 
How convinced are you that global warming is 
happening? 
 
 
Mayer, Adair, and 
Pfaff (2013) 
 
 
USA 
 
Opinion on 
climate change  
 
 
Is the earth’s climate changing? 
 
McCright and Dunlap 
(2011a) 
 
 
USA 
 
Climate change 
denial 
 
Timing of global warming 
 
McCright and Dunlap 
(2011b) 
 
USA 
 
Belief and 
concern about 
global warming 
 
 
Timing of global warming 
 
Poortinga et al. (2011) 
 
UK 
 
Climate 
scepticism 
 
Do you personally think the world’s climate is 
changing or not? 
 
I am uncertain that climate change is really 
happening 
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Most of the research has been conducted on Anglo-Saxon countries, and the USA in 
particular. Some studies have been done on European attitudes in recent years, including a 
few on Norway, which analyse climate change opinion according to Rahmstorf’s framework. 
Although the concept that is measured varies in these articles, the question is in general 
similar. Most of the questions in table 2.1 concern belief that the climate is changing. Some 
questions also involve evidence for climate change. The trend aspect concerns the occurrence 
of climate change. The simplest questions that plainly ask whether one believes that the 
climate is changing might be the most precise and therefore the most suitable.  
 
  
 
Scruggs and Benegal 
(2012) 
 
USA 
 
 
 
Belief that 
warming is 
occurring 
 
The effects of global warming have already begun to 
happen 
 
There is solid evidence that the earth is warming 
 
The world’s temperature may have been going up 
over the last 100 years 
 
 
Spence, Poortinga, 
Butler, and Pidgeon 
(2011) 
 
 
UK 
 
Perception of 
climate change 
 
I am uncertain that climate change is really 
happening 
 
Stevenson, Peterson, 
Bondell, Moore, and 
Carrier (2014) 
 
 
USA 
 
 
Climate change 
acceptance 
 
Whether students believed global warming was 
happening 
 
Tvinnereim and 
Austgulen (2014) 
 
Norway 
 
 
Attitudes towards 
climate change 
 
 
I am certain that climate change is occurring 
 
Floods and heat waves do not increase in scope, it is 
just the media who report more on it 
 
 
Whitmarsh (2011) 
 
UK 
 
Scepticism and 
uncertainty about 
climate change: 
The Scepticism 
scale 
 
I am uncertain about whether climate change is really 
happening 
 
The evidence for climate change is unreliable 
 
There is too much conflicting evidence about climate 
change to know whether it is actually happening 
 
Floods and heat-waves are not increasing, there is 
just more reporting of it in the media these days 
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Climate change attribution 
According to the IPCC, as previously reviewed, human influences on climate change are 
clear. Attribution presupposes trend, because for people to believe in anthropogenic climate 
change, they need to believe that the climate is changing. Measuring attribution is common in 
the literature on climate change attitudes. Previous measures of attribution in the literature are 
presented in table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2: Literature on the attribution aspect of climate change 
 
Authors 
 
 
Country 
 
Concept 
 
Question wording 
 
Austgulen and Stø 
(2013) 
 
Norway 
 
Climate change 
scepticism 
 
Climate change is largely anthropogenic 
 
Climate change is only natural variations in the 
earth’s temperature 
 
Claims that human activity is changing the climate 
are exaggerated 
 
 
Engels et al. (2013) 
 
Germany 
 
 
Climate change 
scepticism 
 
 
Climate change is caused by humans 
 
Feldman et al. (2011) 
 
 
USA 
 
Global warming 
acceptance 
 
 
Belief in the human causes of global warming 
 
 
Hobson and Niemeyer 
(2012) 
 
 
Australia 
 
Climate change 
scepticism 
 
Is it human induced? 
 
 
 
Howe and Leiserowitz 
(2013) 
 
USA 
 
Beliefs about 
global warming 
 
If you had the opportunity to talk to an expert on 
global warming, which question would you ask? 
 
What causes global warming? How do you know that 
global warming is caused mostly by human activities, 
not natural changes in the environment? 
 
Assuming global warming is happening, do you think 
it is…? …Caused mostly by human activities 
…Caused mostly by natural changes in the 
environment 
 
 
Kahan et al. (2011) 
 
USA 
 
Belief in the 
existence of 
scientific 
consensus 
 
Human activity is causing global warming 
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Leviston et al. (2013) 
 
Australia 
 
Opinion on 
climate change 
 
Which of the following statements best describe your 
thoughts on climate change? 
 
I think that climate change is happening, but it’s just 
a natural fluctuation in Earth’s temperatures 
I think that climate change is happening, and I think 
that humans are largely causing it 
Lewandowsky, 
Gignac, and Oberauer 
(2013) 
 
USA 
 
Rejection of 
climate science 
 
 
I believe that the climate is always changing and 
what we are currently observing is just natural 
fluctuation. 
 
I believe that most of the warming over the last 50 
years is due to the increase in greenhouse gas 
concentrations. 
 
I believe that the burning of fossil fuels over the last 
50 years has caused serious damage to the planet’s 
climate. 
 
Human CO2 emissions cause climate change. 
 
Humans are too insignificant to have an appreciable 
impact on global temperature 
 
 
Mayer et al. (2013) 
 
 
USA 
 
Opinion on 
climate change  
 
 
Is climate change primarily because of human 
activities or natural causes? 
 
McCright and Dunlap 
(2011a) 
 
 
USA 
 
Climate change 
denial 
 
Primary cause of global warming 
 
McCright and Dunlap 
(2011b) 
 
USA 
 
Belief and 
concern about 
global warming 
 
 
Primary cause of global warming 
 
Poortinga et al. (2011) 
 
UK 
 
Climate 
scepticism 
 
Thinking about the causes of climate change which, 
if any of the following best describes your opinion? 
 
Climate change is…  
Entirely caused by natural processes, mainly caused 
by natural processes, partly caused by natural 
processes and partly caused by human activity, 
mainly caused by human activity, completely caused 
by human activity 
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Most of the questions for measuring attribution attitudes are similar to each other. To a large 
degree, the questions consider human influences. Giving alternatives for natural and 
anthropogenic causes of climate change seems applicable. This way, attribution acceptance is 
measured while accounting for response set. If answer alternatives simply range between 
‘yes’ and ‘no’ for charged questions, respondents might be affected to answering what they 
think is expected. 
 
Climate change impact 
The IPCC is also clear on the fact that climate change has caused impacts across the earth. 
The literature review presented in table 2.3 shows differences in impact measures. 
 
  
 
Scruggs and Benegal 
(2012) 
 
USA 
 
 
 
Belief that 
warming is 
occurring 
 
 
Emissions of CO2 have only a marginal impact on 
climate change 
 
Stevenson et al. (2014) 
 
 
USA 
 
 
Climate change 
acceptance 
 
 
Asking whether students whether they thought 
climate change was caused by humans 
 
Tvinnereim and 
Austgulen (2014) 
 
Norway 
 
 
Attitudes towards 
climate change 
 
 
Climate change is largely anthropogenic 
 
Claims that human activity is changing the climate 
are exaggerated  
 
 
Whitmarsh (2011) 
 
UK 
 
Scepticism and 
uncertainty about 
climate change: 
The Scepticism 
scale 
 
Claims that human activities are changing the climate 
are exaggerated 
 
Climate change is just a natural fluctuation in earth’s 
temperatures 
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Table 2.3: Literature on the impact aspect of climate change  
  
Authors 
 
Country Concept Question wording 
 
Austgulen and Stø 
(2013) 
 
Norway 
 
Climate change 
scepticism 
 
I am worried about the consequences climate change  
may have for us humans 
 
Overall I would say that the severity of climate 
change are exaggerated in the news 
 
It is too early to say whether climate change is a 
problem 
 
Too much attention is given to climate change 
 
Bohr (2014) 
 
USA 
 
Dismissal of 
climate change 
dangers 
 
In general, do you think that a rise in the world’s 
temperature caused by climate change is extremely 
dangerous for the environment, very dangerous, 
somewhat dangerous, not very dangerous, or not 
dangerous at all for the environment? 
 
Brulle, Carmichael, 
and Jenkins (2012) 
 
USA 
 
Public concern 
 
Do you think global warming is an environmental 
problem that is causing a serious impact now, or do 
you think global warming isn't having a serious 
impact? 
 
Donner and McDaniels 
(2013) 
 
 
USA 
 
Worry about 
global warming 
 
How much do you worry about global warming? 
Engels et al. (2013) 
 
 
Germany 
 
 
Climate change 
scepticism 
 
Climate change is a serious problem 
Feldman et al. (2011) 
 
 
USA 
 
Global warming 
acceptance 
 
 
Concern about global warming impact 
 
Hamilton (2011) 
 
USA 
 
Concern about 
climate change 
 
Do you think that global warming will pose a serious 
threat to you or your way of life in your lifetime, or 
not? 
 
Hobson and Niemeyer 
(2012) 
 
 
Australia 
 
Climate change 
scepticism 
 
Is climate change a problem? 
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Howe and Leiserowitz 
(2013) 
 
USA 
 
Beliefs about 
global warming 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk perception 
 
Beliefs about 
current 
environmental 
impacts  
 
If you had the opportunity to talk to an expert on 
global warming, which question would you ask? 
 
What harm will global warming cause 
When will global warming begin to harm people 
Will global warming harm people’ 
 
Questions about whom, how much, and when global 
warming will harm  
 
Do you agree or disagree that global warming is 
already causing or making the following things 
worse, or do you not know 
 
Kahan, Braman, 
Gastil, Slovic, and 
Mertz (2007) 
 
 
USA 
 
Climate change 
risk perception 
 
Global warming poses a serious danger for the future 
of our planet 
Kahan et al. (2012) 
 
USA 
 
Climate change 
risk perception 
 
How much risk do you believe climate change poses 
to human health, safety or prosperity? 
 
Li et al. (2011) 
 
USA 
Australia 
 
Belief in global 
warming 
 
How much do you personally worry about global 
warming? 
 
Mayer et al. (2013) 
 
USA 
 
Opinion on 
climate change  
 
 
How serious a threat is climate change? 
McCright and Dunlap 
(2011a) 
 
USA 
 
Climate change 
denial 
 
Thinking about what is said in the news, in your view 
is the seriousness of global warming generally 
exaggerated, generally correct, or is it generally 
underestimated? 
 
How much do you personally worry about the 
greenhouse effect or global warming? 
 
Poortinga et al. (2011) 
 
UK 
 
Climate 
scepticism 
 
The seriousness of climate change is exaggerated 
It is uncertain what the effects of climate change will 
be 
 
Scruggs and Benegal 
(2012) 
 
Europe 
 
 
 
Public concern 
 
How serious a problem do you think climate change 
is at this moment? 
The seriousness of climate change has been 
exaggerated 
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Table 2.3 illustrates how impact has been measured differently in climate change opinion 
research. There is particularly a division between concern and threat perception. Concern does 
not seem like a good measure, because not being concerned does not necessarily mean that 
you do not consider climate change a problem. The IPCC reports discuss threat perception 
explicitly, therefore the measure is somewhat grounded in the scientific basis and might be the 
better of the impact measures.  
 
2.2.4 The political climate change perception dimension 
In addition to the scientific related climate change attitudes, there are aspects concerning 
perceptions of climate change that are not based on scientific consensus. These aspects 
concern political perceptions, such as the ability to do something about climate change and 
policy measures to tackle climate change.  
 
Personal threat  
The IPCC states that the impacts on human and natural systems have been widespread. 
Science has not been able to tell who will be the most affected though. Consequently, a 
distinction can be made between overall impacts and personal threat perceptions. In the first 
dimension, impact acceptance was discussed. Some of the measures used in the previous 
literature have a more personal angle. Li et al. (2011) measured how much people personally 
Spence et al. (2011) 
 
 
UK 
 
Perception of 
climate change 
 
How concerned, if at all, are you about climate 
change, sometimes referred to as ‘global warming’? 
 
My local area is likely to be affected by climate 
change 
 
Tvinnereim and 
Austgulen (2014) 
 
Norway 
 
 
Attitudes towards 
climate change 
 
 
We know enough today to be able to say that climate 
change is a problem 
 
Too much attention is given to climate change 
 
Whitmarsh (2011) 
 
UK 
 
Scepticism and 
uncertainty about 
climate change: 
The Scepticism 
scale 
 
I do not believe climate change is a real problem 
 
It is too early to say whether climate change is really 
a problem 
 
Too much fuss is made about climate change 
 
  
 
24 
worried about global warming in the U.S. and Australia. Hamilton (2011) measures concern 
about climate change is the U.S. with the question ‘do you think that global warming will 
pose a serious threat to you or your way of life in lifetime, or not’. Howe and Leiserowitz 
(2013) ask questions concerning personal aspects of climate change: ‘how important is the 
issue of global warming to you personally?’, ‘how much had you thought about global 
warming before today?’, ‘how worried are you about global warming?’, and ‘I have 
personally experienced the effects of global warming’. McCright and Dunlap (2011a) 
measure climate change denial through assessing worry about global warming with the 
following Gallup question: ‘how much do you personally worry about the greenhouse effect 
or global warming?’ 
 
Since threat perception has been measured both overall and personally, without any clear 
distinction in the previous literature, it should be interesting to measure them separately and in 
different dimensions of climate change attitudes. 
 
Efficacy 
There has been a considerable increase in national and sub-national mitigation plans and 
strategies since the previous assessment report in 2007. Since then, cap and trade systems for 
GHG emissions have been established in a number of countries and regions. According to the 
latest Synthesis Report, we have the means to limit climate change and build a more 
prosperous, sustainable future (IPCC, 2014b). Impacts and risks related to climate change can 
be reduced and managed through the process of adaptation and mitigation (IPCC, 2014c). In 
spite of this, the IPCC reports do not mention if and how individuals can help with reduction 
and prevention.  
 
Efficacy has not been widely used in climate change opinion research. However, as part of 
global warming acceptance, Feldman et al. (2011:15) measure the valence of expectations 
regarding the outcomes of taking action on global warming among the U.S. public. 
Respondents were presented with a list of ten potential positive outcomes of taking national 
action on global warming (e.g., help free them from dependence on foreign oil, improve 
people’s health, save many plant and animal species from extinction, prevent the destruction 
of most life on the planet) and six potential negative outcomes of taking action on global 
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warming (e.g., cost jobs and harm our economy, cause energy prices to rise). Respondents 
were asked to indicate all of the items that they thought were true.  
 
Ding, Maibach, Zhao, Roser-Renouf, and Leiserowitz (2011:463) measure injunctive beliefs, 
“the belief that various societal actors should do more to address global warming”. They 
asked whether respondents thought each of the following should be doing more or less to 
address global warming. The items were local government officials, state legislators, 
governors, the US Congress, the president, corporations and industry, and citizens themselves. 
 
Climate change efficacy is not a widely used measure; therefore there is not much to review 
and chose from. Nonetheless, the core of the aspect is the belief that something can be done 
regarding climate change. This might be an important aspect when it comes to public opinion. 
If the public believes that something can be done, it could lead to a higher call for action, and 
if the public does not believe that there is anything that can be done, it will be problematic to 
place climate change policies on the agenda.  
 
Policy 
According to the IPCC, International cooperation is required to effectively mitigate GHG 
emissions and address other climate change issues (IPCC, 2014d:5). It is necessary to act and 
initiate drastic measures to reach the two degrees goal. The longer we wait with implementing 
these measures, the more drastic they will have to be (IPCC, 2014b). Adaptation and 
mitigation are complementary strategies for reducing and managing the risks of climate 
change (IPCC, 2014b:17). 
 
Ding et al. (2011) measure policy support by asking respondents how much they supported or 
opposed specific policies. Krosnick and MacInnis (2012) also measured public opinion on 
climate change through policy endorsements. They measured endorsement of ten policies 
intended to reduce future global warming and constructed a summary index using all of these 
measures. The respondents were asked whether they favoured or opposed the specific policies 
as ways for the federal government to try to reduce future global warming. They were also 
asked whether the government should require some measures by law, encourage with tax 
breaks but not require, or stay out of entirely.  
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The IPCC does not say which policy measures should be used in adaptation and mitigation, as 
they are not policy-prescriptive. Perhaps including ‘policy’ in the climate change perception 
dimension is especially appropriate in the Norwegian case. Earlier studies and public opinion 
polls show that scepticism is not particularly widespread in Norway, but far from all 
Norwegians accept climate change (Austgulen & Stø, 2013; Gallup, 2014; Hellevik, 2010). 
This mainly concerns trend and attribution measures, as well as impact, to some extent. But 
what about policy support? Most Norwegians might believe that the climate is changing 
(trend), that it is caused by human activity (attribution) and that it poses a serious threat 
(impact). However, when it comes to GHG emission reductions, the Norwegian people are 
very divided when it comes to actual oil and gas extraction. Thus, a policy measure with 
questions on oil would be really interesting. This way, the Norwegian paradox (of oil and 
climate change) can be incorporated into the dependent variable, and not just as a factor with 
influence on acceptance.  
 
It should be interesting to analyse how the public perceives climate change in regards to 
personal impacts, the possibility of doing something, as well as what should be done. 
Therefore, personal threat perception, efficacy belief and policy support are included as a 
second dimension in my thesis.  
 
2.3 Factors influencing climate change attitudes 
In the climate change opinion literature, different factors have been tested for influencing 
attitudes on climate change. Now that I have divided climate change attitudes into two 
dimensions, the assumption is that these issues can be separated and thus explained by 
different factors. I will focus on two main factors explaining the two dimensions respectively. 
I include some of the dominating explanations from Anglo-Saxon and European studies, as 
well as one case-specific explanation for Norway. In addition, some demographic factors that 
also may play parts in explaining climate change attitudes will be outlined.  
 
2.3.1 Trust in scientists 
According to Kellstedt, Zahran, and Vedlitz (2008:115-6) trust is an important factor in 
influencing risk interpretation and support for policy choices in the face of risk. Risk 
perception might thus be related to individual levels of trust in the experts on the subject. 
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Poortinga and Pidgeon (2003) stress the importance of trust as a necessary construct in 
understanding risk perceptions, while examining the dimensions of trust and their relationship 
to risk regulation in five policy areas, including climate change. Krosnick, Holbrook, Lowe, 
and Visser (2006) argue that people minimally trusting of scientists, the primary informants 
about climate change, are not persuaded by information provided by scientists, but instead 
derive their opinions simply from their personal experiences with weather changes. Among 
people more trusting of scientists, exposure to new information should increase belief in the 
existence of climate change. Trust plays an important role in communicating information 
about risks to the public (Krosnick et al., 2006:38). 
 
Krosnick and MacInnis (2012) found that a decline among Americans, who wanted 
government to take specific actions to mitigate the effects of global warming in 2010 and 
2012, was concentrated among people who did not trust environmental scientists. Kellstedt et 
al. (2008) found that respondents with high confidence in scientists feel less responsible for 
global warming, and also show less concern for global warming. Krosnick et al. (2006:28) 
found that greater television exposure was associated with an increase in belief in the 
existence of global warming only among people who trusted scientists and who were highly 
educated. Mayer et al. (2013) found that those who are more trusting express greater support 
across policy alternatives.  
 
H1: Trust in scientists has a positive effect on climate change attitudes  
 
2.3.2 World-view 
According to Wood and Vedlitz (2007:556), “people process information about issues 
through a filter containing a range of variables relating to their predispositions” when they 
have limited knowledge of an issue and are exposed to ambiguous information. One of the 
important predisposed variables is their political orientation. This assumption is called the 
information processing theory (Hamilton, 2011). Political orientation appears to play such a 
dominant role in structuring how an individual reacts to scientific knowledge (Bohr, 2014). 
The fact that people have become less concerned and more sceptical towards climate change 
while the scientific evidence on climate change becomes stronger, make researchers look to 
differences in worldview as an explanation of public opinion on climate change (Austgulen & 
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Stø, 2013). Zia and Todd (2010:5) argue that because individuals and groups make decisions 
on adaptation strategies based on political beliefs, acceptance of climate policy depends on 
ideology. Political ideology influences citizen concern about policy issues such as global 
warming, more than educational background does, according to Zia and Todd (2010:13). 
 
Kellstedt et al. (2008:115) argue that world-views are “highly correlated with risk perceptions 
of various technological and ecological dangers”. The left-right dimension influences a lot of 
how we perceive political events and choices (Kellstedt et al., 2008:115). Individualistic 
values have been found to influence climate change opinion with more scepticism. According 
to Corner (2012), people with in individualistic values dislike political interference in 
decision-making, and are more prone to be sceptical towards climate change. Individuals with 
conservative ideologies tend to discount anthropogenic climate change (Dunlap & McCright, 
2008). Research has found that conservative respondents are more sceptical towards climate 
change than others (Dunlap & McCright, 2008; Eurobarometer, 2009; McCright & Dunlap, 
2011a, 2011b; Whitmarsh, 2011; Zia & Todd, 2010). Zia and Todd (2010) find a decreasing 
concern for global warming decreases with citizens’ ideology shifting from liberal to 
conservative.  
 
H2: Political orientation towards the right has a negative effect on climate change attitudes 
 
2.3.3 Main explanations for the dimensions of climate change attitudes 
The climate change attitudes discussed in this thesis is divided into two dimensions. The first 
dimension, climate change acceptance, is closely related to scientific knowledge. The second 
dimension, climate change perception, is related to political issues. This division leads to the 
assumption that different factors explain the two separate dimensions.  
 
Because climate change acceptance is so closely related to scientific knowledge as 
communicated by the IPCC, I expect that trust in scientists is the factor with most explanatory 
power for the aspects in the first dimension. Political factors should not have that large an 
influence whether scientific consensus is accepted or rejected, because they are not political 
issues, but scientific issues.  
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H3: Trust in scientists is more important for explaining the scientific related aspects of 
climate change attitudes, than political orientation 
 
Perceptions of political aspects of climate change, on the other hand, need not be influenced 
by scientific factors. Belief in personal consequences, ability for prevention and support for 
measures to deal with the consequences of climate change should be closer affiliated with 
political and ideological predispositions. 
 
H4: Political orientation is more important for explaining the political related aspects of 
climate change attitudes, than trust in scientists 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the theoretical assumptions of explaining the two dimensions of climate 
change attitudes.  
 
Figure 2.1: Factors explaining climate change attitudes 
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2.3.4 Alternative explanations 
In addition the main factors that are expected to explain the two dimensions of climate change 
attitudes, other explanations have been viewed as important factors in the climate change 
public opinion research field. 
 
Party affiliation 
Party identification may reflect different types of desired social solidarity, such as 
collectivism versus individualism (Bohr, 2014). A significant ideological and partisan 
polarization has occurred on the issue of climate change in the USA over the last years 
(McCright & Dunlap, 2011b). Dunlap and McCright (2008) find party affiliation to predict 
beliefs about climate change in the American public. A decline in the proportion of people 
favouring government action on mitigation was greater among Republicans than among 
Democrats and Independents from 2010 to 2012, according to Krosnick and MacInnis (2012). 
Feldman et al. (2011) report that Republicans are less attentive to and knowledgeable about 
climate change relative to Democrats. 
 
According to Austgulen and Stø (2013), climate change attitudes are less correlated with party 
vote in the Norwegian multi-party system, than in the British and American two-party system. 
Nonetheless, FrP-voters are the most sceptical. Olofsson and Öhman (2006) found that 
political affiliation has a strong relationship with environmental concern in Norway and 
Sweden, with low levels for the right. Karlstrøm and Ryghaug (2014) found that party 
preference is connected to attitudes towards renewable energy sources and technologies in 
Norway.  
 
Knowledge 
A dominating assumption in the social science field of climate change resource has been that 
a lack of knowledge has been the cause of climate change scepticism among the public 
(Austgulen & Stø, 2013). The information deficit model is used to explain lack of public 
climate support and sceptical attitudes (Brulle et al., 2012).  Increased dissemination about 
climate change is considered as a solution to this problem. The assumption here is that 
providing information about climate change will lead to increased public concern and 
willingness to act (Kellstedt et al., 2008). Thus, the reason for the public not demanding 
action is not because they do not care enough about climate change, but because they do not 
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know enough about it. The more people know about climate change, the more they will feel 
personally responsible for it (Kellstedt et al., 2008). If this approach is true, then respondents 
with higher education and climate change knowledge should be more accepting of climate 
change than others.  
 
Knowledge can be acquired through education (Franzen & Meyer, 2010), and education is 
therefore often used as an indirect measure of climate change knowledge. According to 
Krosnick et al. (2006:14) people with greater cognitive skills are “best equipped to see flaws 
in messages they receive from informants, and these individuals are able to retain new 
information in their memories over longer time periods”.  
 
Austgulen and Stø (2013) found that higher education decreased the level of scepticism in 
Norway. Olofsson and Öhman (2006) found a strong positive relationship between education 
and environmental concern in Norway, Sweden, Canada and the USA. Krosnick et al. (2006) 
measured cognitive skills via number of years of formal education, to explain climate change 
opinion. Among people who trusted scientists, acceptance of their claims was most likely 
among people who were highly cognitively skilled. People exposed to news about scientific 
controversy and with low cognitive skills were the most climate change sceptical (Krosnick et 
al., 2006:30). McCright and Dunlap (2011a) found that lesser educated adults were more 
likely than their more highly educated counterparts to believe human activities are not the 
primary cause of recent warming and that there is no scientific consensus. 
 
Yet, not all research supports this theory. Hamilton (2011) found no significant effect of 
education on climate change attitudes in his study on American concern. According to 
Kellstedt et al. (2008:115) people that are knowledgeable of the causes, properties, and effects 
of climate change have lower levels of risk perception. Kellstedt et al. (2008:122) argue that 
the knowledge-deficit model is inadequate for understanding mass attitudes about scientific 
controversies in the USA. Compared to the rest of the world, the United States has average 
knowledge levels about global warming, despite being among the best-educated countries in 
the world. According to Kellstedt et al. (2008), it is possible that a similar pattern of findings 
can be found in Europe. However, the information effects reported in that article were limited 
to self-reported information.  
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Personal and economic interests 
Economic interests have also been recognized as a factor influencing individual political 
preferences. In Norway, oil and gas extraction is a significant industry and an important 
source to GDP (Eika, Prestmo, & Tveter, 2010). According to Norgaard (2011), Norwegian 
climate change scepticism can be explained by the importance of oil and gas extraction for the 
Norwegian economy. 
 
Tvinnereim and Austgulen (2014:319) argue that, by working closely related to production or 
consumption of fossil fuels, the main source for anthropogenic climate change, it is probable 
that this personal economic interest influences climate change perception and the 
interpretation of climate science. If you work close to fossil fuel production or consumption, 
you might hope that climate change is not so serious a threat, because climate change policies 
reducing extraction and production will influence the marked value and thus job 
opportunities. Also, the psychological effect of cognitive dissonance2 might be larger for 
people working in the sector (Tvinnereim & Austgulen, 2014:320). Tvinnereim and 
Austgulen (2014) find that being employed in the oil and gas industry has a significant effect 
on climate change attitudes in Norway.  
 
Demographic factors 
In addition to these explanations, there are also demographic factors that may influence 
climate change opinion and are normally included in analyses. Gender is thought to have a 
significant effect on climate change acceptance. Research consistently shows that women are 
more accepting and fearful of the risks of climate change (Bord, Fisher, & O'Connor, 1998; 
Feldman et al., 2011; Hamilton, 2011; Kahan et al., 2007; Kellstedt et al., 2008; McCright & 
Dunlap, 2011a). Females in general appear to be more concerned about every public issue 
(Zia & Todd, 2010). Considering the Norwegian case, Austgulen and Stø (2013) also found a 
negative effect of female on scepticism.  
                                                
2 Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory suggests that people have an inner drive to hold all attitudes and beliefs 
in harmony and avoid dissonance. Dissonance creates psychological discomfort that motivates to reduce 
dissonance and achieve consistency. This leads people to actively avoiding situations and information that is 
likely to increase dissonance (Festinger, 1962). 
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Another demographic variable is age. Many studies have found that older respondents stand 
out (Bohr, 2014; Hamilton, 2011; Heath & Gifford, 2006). Dunlap and McCright (2008) 
found that age has a negative impact on global warming beliefs. Age generally has no effect 
on climate change denial, but older adults are more likely than younger adults to believe there 
is no scientific consensus, according to McCright and Dunlap (2011a). Feldman et al. (2011) 
found no effect of age on global warming acceptance in the USA. Austgulen and Stø (2013) 
found a positive effect of age on scepticism in Norway.  
 
Income is a socioeconomic factor that may also influence climate change acceptance. Franzen 
and Meyer (2010) found that income has a positive effect on environmental concern, on the 
individual level. Dunlap and McCright (2008) found that income has a negative effect on 
seriousness of global warming. Feldman et al. (2011) found no effect of income on global 
warming acceptance in the USA. Income and the support for climate change policies on the 
other hand were not correlated in Germany (Dietz, Dan, & Shwom, 2007; Engels et al., 2013). 
Increased income predicts a higher probability of dismissing climate dangers among 
Republican-leaning individuals when compared with Independents and Democrats, according 
to Bohr (2014). This indicates that income only predicts climate change beliefs in the 
presence of certain political orientations (Bohr, 2014). Austgulen and Stø (2013) argue that 
their individualism index works as an intermediate variable for income, but income is not 
significant on its own. 
 
2.4 Summarizing the theoretical framework 
In this chapter, I have gone through the scientific knowledge on climate change as 
communicated by the IPCC reports. I have argued that climate change attitudes cover various 
aspects, and discussed the need for a new way of organizing these aspects. My suggestion has 
been to divide climate change attitudes into two dimensions, one scientific related, and one 
political related. The expectation is that these two dimensions are explained by different 
factors.  
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Table 2.1 illustrates the expected influences of the two main explanatory factors. The 
assumption is that trust in scientists explains the climate change acceptance dimension, 
consisting of trend acceptance, attribution acceptance and overall threat perception. On the 
other hand, the assumption is that political orientation explains the second dimension, 
consisting of personal threat perception, efficacy belief and policy support. 
 
 
Table 2.4: Expected influences of trust in scientists and political orientation 
 
  
Trust in scientists 
 
Political orientation 
 
Trend acceptance X  
Attribution acceptance X  
Overall threat perception X  
Personal threat perception  X 
Efficacy belief  X 
Policy support  X   
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3 Climate change attitudes in Norway at the 
individual level 
This chapter will focus on the dependent variables on climate change acceptance in Norway. 
First, the climate change debate and public opinion in Norway will be outlined. Second, the 
data used in this thesis will be presented. Following, the dependent variables will be 
operationalized. Descriptive statistics with distributions of the variables will be presented, 
before comparing and correlating the variables. The aim of this chapter is to look at how 
climate change acceptance unfolds among the Norwegian public.  
 
3.1 Climate change opinion in Norway 
The results on climate change opinion vary accordingly with the different conceptualizations 
and measurements. At the same time, findings differ across countries. Notably, the Anglo-
Saxon countries, USA, UK, Canada and Australia, have a similar cultural heritage, and the 
Anglo-Saxon public are in general sceptical. The largest part of the literature has been based 
on these countries, but more studies on European countries have entered the fields in recent 
years. 
 
The Anglo-Saxon countries are all high up on the list of oil production in the world, especially 
the USA and Canada. They all outnumber the European mainland by far (IEA, 2014). The 
U.S. public is less likely to believe that climate change is occurring and that it poses a 
problem, than do citizens in most other wealthy nations (Marquart-Pyatt et al., 2011). In the 
US, public belief in and concern about climate change has fallen since 2008. Mayer et al. 
(2013) find that 50 per cent of Americans are convinced that climate change is now occurring, 
and an additional 34 per cent think it is probably occurring. 
 
Using Rahmstorf’s framework, Poortinga et al. (2011) found that climate change scepticism is 
not widespread in Britain. Although uncertainty and scepticism about the potential impacts of 
climate change were fairly common, both trend and attribution scepticism were much less 
prevalent. It further showed that the different types of scepticism are strongly interrelated.  
 
  
 
36 
The EU as a whole is the second highest producer of renewable energy sources in the world 
(after China) (IEA, 2014). Germany has the highest level of the EU countries, and is currently 
undergoing a large transition – Energiwende. Engels et al. (2013) analyse public climate 
change scepticism in Germany. They stress that few studies have analysed whether there has 
been a growth in climate change scepticism outside of the Anglo-Saxon world. They draw 
distinction between Anglo-Saxon countries and Germany, where their findings suggest that 
there is no evident decline in public concern in Germany, as opposed to other countries. 
 
According to Leiserowitz (2007) the public and elites in Europe have a much higher level of 
concern about climate change and basic acceptance of climate science than the American 
public and elites. Scruggs and Benegal (2012:512) find that the magnitude of the decline in 
opinion in the EU during the economic recession was very similar to what was observed in 
the USA. 
 
Norway is a different and interesting case. Like Germany, Norway is ahead when it comes to 
renewable energy sources, and follows Germany as the second highest renewable energy 
producer in Europe, and eight highest in the world (IEA, 2014). The country is also eager to 
be a driving force in international climate politics. However, Norway’s wealth is to a high 
degree due to its large oil resources, and the Norwegian economy is dependent on the oil 
industry. Norway ranks as number 14 on a list of countries by oil production, while as number 
118 over countries by population (IEA, 2014). Austgulen and Stø (2013) found that denial of 
climate change is not widespread in Norway, but that scepticism about its impact and 
seriousness are fairly common. The study showed that trend scepticism in Norway is weak, 
but the results of the other attribution and impact scepticism were more complex. The results 
showed that climate change scepticism within the Norwegian population seems to be higher 
than previously reported in studies mainly measuring attribution scepticism. In addition, 
climate change scepticism seemed high compared to other European countries (Austgulen & 
Stø, 2013). 
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Duarte and Yagodin (2012) analysed Norwegian press coverage after Climategate3. They 
found that sceptics are not excluded from media discourse on climate change, but endowed 
with sensible symbolic value. Climate science played a secondary role throughout the 
coverage, giving way to politics. After Climategate, there seemed to be an increase in 
sceptical voices in the climate coverage in the Norwegian press. The largest genre reflecting 
scepticism in the climate coverage was not the news articles, but rather the letters to the 
editor, demonstrating public involvement in the debate. Climate sceptics or deniers wrote a 
large proportion of the letters to the editor (Duarte & Yagodin, 2012).  
 
Recently, the debate on climate change opinion has increased in the Norwegian scientific 
community. The media has played a large part here, with numerous newspaper articles. Head 
of the department of petroleum technology at the University of Stavanger (UiS), Hans Borge, 
made a stir by stating that he did not believe in the IPCC conclusion that climate change has 
anthropogenic causes (Borge, 2014). Borge was very critical to the structure and working 
methods of the IPCC. As head of a scientific community, this kind of statement undermines 
the strong scientific consensus. At the same time, it is interesting that this sceptical view came 
from the petroleum community, which plays a significant role in CO2 emissions. In fact, he 
stated that there should be a bigger focus and commitment to oil research (Larsen & Hetland, 
2014).  
 
According to Borge (2014), The IPCC is both a scientific and political body. He questioned 
the relationship between science and politics. He claimed that Norwegian press is far less 
critical than foreign press, when it comes to climate issues. The IPCC’s work methods, power 
structures, financial transactions, commercial implications and influence from lobbyists 
should, according to Borge (2014), be as interesting to journalists as the conclusions in the 
reports. The dean at the faculty of science, Øystein Lund Bø, joined the debate after the 
University, in particular the science community, received a lot of criticism and people took 
distance from the statements. The dean expressed his agreement with the scientific consensus, 
but stressed the fact that Borge has his own opinions, and that it does not represent an official 
                                                
3 Climategate refers to the hacking of a server at the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) at the University of East 
Anglia (UEA) in November 2009, weeks before the Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change (COP 15). Sceptics 
and deniers argued that the leaked emails showed that climate change was a scientific conspiracy.  
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stand from the university. He emphasized the importance of scientific freedom, and of not 
silencing employees with opinions that differ from popular view, or that appear politically 
incorrect (Bø, 2014).  
 
In addition to the debate in the scientific community, sceptical attitudes towards climate 
change have been present in the political debate. Finance minister and FrP leader Siv Jensen 
stated in an interview that she is uncertain about anthropogenic causes of climate change 
(Gjerde, Ørstavik, & Barstad, 2015). Thus, sceptical attitudes are present in the public 
discourse on climate change. 
 
3.2 Data 
My research question concerns public opinion and attitudes, consequently survey data and a 
quantitative approach are appropriate. Research on climate change attitudes in Norway is 
limited, and it is therefore purposeful to study this in more depth and on micro level. The data 
used in this thesis is derived from The Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP). The NCP is a web-
based survey public opinion on important societal and political matters in Norway (Ivarsflaten 
et al., 2014). One of the main focus areas of the NCP is climate and environment, thus the 
data on climate change is extensive. The data are individual units on micro level consisting of 
Norwegian citizens above the age of 18. Respondents are recruited randomly from the 
Norwegian population register, and encouraged to participate over time. The first round of the 
survey was fielded in the fall of 2013 and is carried out twice a year.  
 
The data used in this thesis consists of 4905 respondents from the first round in 2013. I have 
chosen the first round because of the questions included as well as the N. It should be noted 
that all the questions from the citizen panel are asked and answered in Norwegian, but have 
been translated to English after the data collection. Accordingly, the question wording 
presented in this thesis might, to some degree, differ to the actual wording from the conducted 
survey. There will always be a possibility of some inaccuracy when it comes to translation. 
This can lead to different interpretations, but should not have large consequences for the 
results. 
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3.3 Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables 
Based on the aspects discussed in the theoretical framework, my analysis will be based on six 
different dependent variables. Table 3.1 presents the six dependent variables. The data have 
been weighted to compensate for observed bias, based on the demographic variables, age, 
gender, geography and education. I have organized all the variables on a 0-1 scale for 
comparison purposes, where higher levels indicate higher acceptance. The mean in a dummy 
variable is the same as the distribution on the 1-value, while the confidence intervals indicate 
an estimation of uncertainty. Two of the variables, trend and attribution acceptance, are 
dummies, while the four remaining are ordinal. Personal and overall threat perception have 
five values, while efficacy belief has four, and policy support three. Missing values (no 
answer) are removed from the analysis. The N ranges from a little over 2300 for the split 
sample variables measuring threat, to 4701 for the dummy variables measuring trend and 
attribution. Thus the sample varies between the different variables. However, as they are 
randomized and, in the descriptive statistics, weighted, this should not pose any interpretation 
problems for comparisons.  
 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables 
 
Variable 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Std.Err. 
 
95% Confidence interval 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
Trend acceptance 4701 .92 .01 .91 .93 0 1 
Attribution acceptance 4701 .66 .01 .65 .68 0 1 
Overall threat perception 2335 .7 .01 .69 .71 0 1 
Personal threat perception 2379 .45 .01 .44 .46 0 1 
Efficacy belief 4412 .43 .00 .42 .44 0 1 
Policy support 4665 .67 .01 .66 .69 0 1 
Source: The Norwegian Citizen Panel (round 1) 2013 
 
3.3.1 Trend acceptance 
Trend is the most basic dimension in the analysis, and is measured with belief that the climate 
is changing. The question utilized by the NCP asks which of the following statements best 
describes the respondents’ viewpoint on climate change. The alternatives presented in the 
survey are: “I think that the climate is not changing”, “I don't know whether the climate is 
changing or not”, “I think that the climate is changing, but it is only to a small extent linked to 
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human influences”, and “I think that the climate is changing, and that it is largely a result of 
human influences”. Table 1 shows the distribution of the question in its original form.  
 
Table 3.2: Trend and attribution 
 
Statement fits view on climate change 
 
Frequency (N) 
 
Per cent (weighted) 
 
I believe that the climate is not changing 35 1 
 
I don’t know whether the climate is changing or not 311 7 
 
I believe that the climate is changing, but that it has little to 
do with human action 
1,056 26 
I believe that the climate is changing, and that it to a large 
extent is due to human action 
3,299 66 
Total 4,701 100 
Source: The Norwegian Citizen Panel (round 1) 2013. Question w01_km4 
 
While considering trend, I am only interested in whether the respondents believe that climate 
change is happening, and not whether it is caused by human action. Therefore, I combine the 
two answers that agree that the climate is changing but disagree on human influences. I create 
a dummy variable where the two other alternatives of decline and uncertainty are combined 
and valued 0, while acceptance is valued 1. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution on the values.  
 
Figure 3.1: Trend acceptance: belief that climate change is happening 
 
 
N=4,701. Source: The Norwegian Citizen Panel (round 1) 2013. Question w01_km4 
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The figure shows that there is an overwhelming majority that believes that the climate is 
changing, which indicates a high level of trend acceptance in Norway. 92 per cent believe that 
the climate is changing, and only eight per cent are uncertain or dismiss it. Thus, we can 
hardly speak of any trend scepticism in Norway. There is a 95 per cent certainty that the mean 
is between .91 and .93 in the population. This result is high compared to the USA, where 
Mayer et al. (2013) found that 84 per cent believed the climate is changing or probably 
changing, the highest reported result the last years. Only 78 per cent of British respondents 
believed that climate change is occurring in a survey in 2010 (Poortinga et al., 2011). The 
results are similar to those in Germany based on a research by Engels et al. (2013). Though 
measuring scepticism and not acceptance. According to the research by Austgulen and Stø 
(2013), about 82 per cent of Norwegians are certain that the climate is changing. Thus, my 
results are higher. However, the values and construction of the variables differ, so they are not 
completely comparable. 
 
3.3.2 Attribution acceptance 
To measure attribution acceptance, I use the same question as for trend (see table 3.2). I create 
a dummy variable where the belief that climate change is largely a result of human influence 
is valued 1, and the belief that it is only to a small extent linked to human influences is valued 
0. In addition, the belief that the climate is not changing and uncertainty whether the climate 
is changing are also valued 0. Attribution acceptance presupposes trend acceptance in this 
question. This should not pose a problem, because respondents would hardly answer that they 
believe climate change is human caused if they did not believe that the climate is changing. 
 
As shown in figure 3.2, the majority of the respondents, 66 per cent, believe that climate 
change is human caused. This indicates high levels of attribution acceptance, although not as 
high as seen for trend. The 34 per cent that represent uncertainty or denial also include 
respondents who have not taken a position on human causes, but nonetheless do not accept 
climate change attribution. The mean, .66, is relatively high and close to 1 and full 
acceptance. According to the confidence intervals, there is a 95 per cent certainty that the 
mean in the population lies somewhere between .65 and .68.  
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Figure 3.2: Attribution acceptance: belief that climate change is anthropogenic 
 
 
N=4,701. Source: The Norwegian Citizen Panel (round 1) 2013. Question w01_km4 
 
 
This result is higher than those for the USA and Britain, and slightly higher than for Germany. 
Mayer et al. (2013) found that 54 per cent of Americans believe that climate change is 
primarily caused by human activity. Only 31 per cent of the British public believed that 
climate change was mainly or entirely caused by human activities, but a plurality believed it 
to be caused by both natural processes and human activity (Poortinga et al., 2011). 63 per cent 
of the German public agree that climate change is anthropogenic (Engels et al., 2013), which 
is similar to my findings for the Norwegian case. According to Austgulen and Stø (2013), 69 
per cent of Norwegians believe that climate changes are mostly caused by human action, 
similar to my results.  
 
3.3.3 Overall threat perception 
In the literature on climate change opinion, impact has been measured as both concern and 
threat. The data from the NCP includes questions on both. Concern is slightly indistinct and 
can be thought of as dependent on personality. It is possible that concern measures other 
aspects than climate change attitudes, and that people who are generally concerned are 
accordingly concerned about climate change. The IPCC reports discuss risk perception (IPCC, 
2014c, 2014d), which can be considered a better and more concrete measure of the impact 
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concept. Threat perception is a form of impact acceptance, because by perceiving climate 
change as a threat, one believes that there are impacts that are threatening.  
 
There are two different questions on threat perception in the NCP survey, one that concerns 
personal threat, and another concerning general threat. Personal threat can be considered more 
concrete, while overall threat is more inclusive. Personal threat might influence how serious 
one considers the issue, while overall threat is more in line with the view that climate change 
is a global problem. These two questions were randomized into two groups in the survey, so 
that the respondents were asked one of the two questions. Therefore, the respondents have not 
compared the two alternatives with each other, and the samples are different.  
 
For overall threat, respondents are asked how serious a threat climate change is overall. The 
five alternative answers range from ‘not a threat’ to ‘very serious’. Figures 3.3 illustrate the 
frequency for overall threat perception.  
 
Figure 3.3: Overall threat perception 
 
 
N=2,335. Source: The Norwegian Citizen Panel (round 1) 2013. Question w01_km5 
 
Only one per cent of all respondents did not perceive climate change as an overall threat, 
while seven per cent found it not very serious. Around 26 per cent perceived climate change 
as a somewhat serious threat and 42 per cent answered ‘serious’. 24 per cent of respondents 
perceived climate change as a ‘very serious’ overall threat. In general, the distribution of 
N=24 N=142
N=556
N=991
N=622
0
10
20
30
40
P
er
ce
nt
No
t a
 th
rea
t
Ve
ry 
se
rio
us
No
t v
ery
 se
rio
us
So
me
wh
at 
se
rio
us
Se
rio
us
How serious is climate change overall?
Overall threat
  
 
44 
overall threat leans towards the higher values to the right. The highest response rate is for 
serious, and the mean is .7, which indicates a high level of acceptance of climate change 
impact.  
 
3.3.4 Personal threat perception 
Respondents are asked how serious a threat climate change is to them personally. The five 
alternative answers are identical to those for overall threat and range from ‘not a threat’ to 
‘very serious’. Figure 3.4 illustrates personal threat perception in Norway. Eleven per cent did 
not perceive climate change as a personal threat, while 29 per cent believed climate change to 
be a not very serious personal threat. 35 per cent believed that climate change is somewhat 
serious to them personally, and around 20 per cent find it serious. Only 5 per cent perceived 
climate change as a very serious personal threat.  
 
Figure 3.4: Personal threat perception 
 
 
N=2,379. Source: The Norwegian Citizen Panel (round 1) 2013. Question w01_km6 
 
 
The highest frequency for personal threat is on the middle value, ‘somewhat serious’. 
Personal threat perception is more centred, than overall threat, but leans a little to the left. The 
largest divide between the two threat measures is found for ‘not very serious’ with 29 per cent 
of the respondents on personal threat, compared to only seven per cent on overall threat. The 
mean for personal threat is .45, which is slightly lower than halfway to full perception, and 
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significantly lower than overall threat perception. This indicates a higher threat perception 
concerning the world than oneself, thus accepting that climate change has worldwide impacts. 
This result is interesting, though not that surprising, as prognoses indicate that the highest 
impacts of climate change will be experienced by poorer countries (IPCC, 2014b). Still, these 
results imply that Norwegians do view climate change as a serious threat, although they do 
not themselves feel particularly threatened. This finding indicates that the form of threat we 
discuss matters, and it is necessary to distinguish between the different forms.  
 
In addition, the finding is in line with the argument of Lorenzoni and Pidgeon (2006:80) from 
other studies, that “although most Europeans are aware of the potential risks of climate 
change world-wide and the adverse consequences that may befall societies in general, they 
tend to attenuate the risks to themselves personally”. Mayer et al. (2013) found in their study 
that 38 per cent of Americans view climate change as a very serious threat and an additional 
46 per cent as a somewhat serious threat. According to the Eurobarometer (2011) 68 per cent 
of EU citizens view climate change as a very serious problem with a mean of 7.4 on 1-10 
scale. Though different measures and not completely comparable, it is interesting to note that 
this level is very similar to the mean of overall threat (.7 on a 0-1 scale). Engels et al. (2013) 
showed that 65 per cent of the German repsondents believed that climate change is a serious 
problem, and an additional 18 per cent believe it to be very serious. Austgulen and Stø (2013) 
found a significant proportion of the Norwegian public to be uncertain of the seriousness and 
potential consequences of climate change. Between 29 and 43 per cent of the respondents 
express impact scepticism through different measures. My results show that 29 per cent of 
respondents do not view climate change as a serious threat to them personally, so there are 
some similarities in my and Austgulen and Stø’s findings.  
 
3.3.5 Efficacy belief 
The previous results show that, in general, Norwegians think climate change is happening, 
that it is mainly caused by human activity and that it is a serious threat overall, which are all 
based on science. How about action? Do they believe that something can be done? I measure 
efficacy belief using a question that asks the respondents to what extent they think it is 
possible to do anything in order to prevent harmful climate change. The alternatives are: ‘it is 
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not possible’, ‘it is possible, but very difficult’, ‘it is possible and entirely realistic’, and ‘it is 
easy to prevent harmful climate change’.  
 
Figure 3.5: Efficacy: belief in prevention 
 
 
N=4,412. Source: The Norwegian Citizen Panel (round 1) 2013. Question w01_km7 
 
Figure 3.5 shows that most people think it is possible to prevent harmful climate change, but a 
majority of 60 per cent considers it very difficult. 32 per cent think it is completely realistic. 
About six per cent think it is impossible, and only two per cent view it as easy. The mean of 
.43 is closer to 0 than to 1, which indicates a relatively low level of belief and some 
resistance. However, only seven per cent believe prevention is impossible, so there is not a 
high degree of scepticism. The 60 per cent that consider it very difficult to do anything to 
prevent harmful climate changes pull down the mean, as this option is valued .33. Still, it is 
important to note that they do consider it possible, so they do accept that something can be 
done.  
 
3.3.6 Policy support 
The IPCC is not policy-prescriptive (IPCC, 2014a), but the reports stress that mitigation and 
adaptation is necessary (IPCC, 2014b). The debate on whether reduction in oil extraction in 
Norway is the right measure is on going. Some claim that it is better that the world’s energy 
N=253
N=2,661
N=1,434
N=640
20
40
60
P
er
ce
nt
Im
po
ss
ibl
e
Po
ss
ibl
e, 
bu
t v
ery
 di
ffic
ult
Po
ss
ibl
e a
nd
 co
mp
let
ely
 re
ali
sti
c
Ea
sy
Possible to do anything to prevent harmful climate changes
Agency
  
 
47 
use is supplied by Norwegian oil than oil from other countries, as it is cleaner. Others believe 
that we need to move on to renewable energy sources nevertheless.  
 
When it comes to policies and measures, the Norwegian case is a paradox. Norway is highly 
dependent on the oil industry, while simultaneously aspiring to be a leading country on green 
energy sources and a frontrunner in the global fight to tackle climate change. This makes it 
interesting to measure levels of policy support regarding the oil industry. I measure Policy 
support with a question asking respondents which of the following statements they agree with 
the most. Norway should continue to produce ‘as much oil as we currently do’, ‘less oil than 
we currently do’, or ‘more oil than we currently do’. This question is central and controversial 
in the Norwegian debate on climate change. 
 
Figure 3.6: Policy support: oil extraction 
 
 
N=4,665. Source: The Norwegian Citizen Panel (round 1) 2013. Question w01_km37 
 
Figure 3.6 shows that there is a slight majority of 51 per cent in favour of maintaining oil 
production at current levels. Only seven per cent think that Norway should produce more oil 
than currently, and 42 per cent answer that Norway should produce less oil. The variable is 
organized such that less oil has the highest value and more oil the lowest, interpreting less oil 
as more policy accepting. The mean, .67, shows a relative high degree of policy support, 
though the measure can be thought to cover other issues than climate change. Still, the 
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measure is interesting in the Norwegian context, where the public is divided in regards to 
dealing with the oil issue.  
 
3.4 Comparing the climate change dimensions 
The data indicate that trend acceptance is very high, attribution acceptance and policy support 
are relatively high, while efficacy belief is somewhat low. Threat perception is more 
complicated with high levels concerning overall threat, but low levels of personal threat 
perception. The next step is to combine the six variables to analyse their correlations. As they 
are all measures of climate change attitudes, I expect positive correlations. Trend, attribution 
and overall threat are theoretically and scientifically grounded, while personal threat, efficacy 
and policy are more debatable. Poortinga et al. (2011) find in their study that the different 
types of scepticism are strongly interrelated. “Although this may suggest that the general 
public does not clearly distinguish between the different aspects of the climate debate, there is 
a clear gradation in prevalence along the Rahmstorf typology” (Poortinga et al., 2011:2). 
 
Table 3.3: Correlation between the six climate change attitude variables 
 
Trend Attribution Overall 
threat 
Personal 
threat 
Efficacy Policy 
 
Trend 1.0000 
 
 
 
    
 
Attribution 0.4324* 1.0000 
 
    
 
Overall threat 0.2066* 
 
0.5522* 
 
1.0000 
   
 
Personal threat 
 
 
0.1613* 
 
0.4045* X 1.0000 
  
 
 
 
Efficacy 0.0686* 0.2008* 
 
0.1637* 
 
0.1554* 
 
1.0000 
 
 
Policy 0.1139* 0.3087* 0.4137* 0.3420* 
 
0.1218* 1.0000 
    *p-value<.001 
 
All the variables are positively correlated and significant on a 1-per cent level. There are no 
data for the correlation between the two different types of threat, because the respondents 
were randomized and asked only one of the questions. The trend and attribution variables are 
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generated from the same question. The correlations are not problematically high, as 
collinearity is problematic mainly when the correlation exceeds .6 (Skog, 2004:288). 
 
The highest correlations are found between overall threat and attribution, overall threat and 
policy, and personal threat and attribution. The lowest correlation, on the other hand, is 
between trend and efficacy. In general, attribution, overall threat and policy correlate highly 
with the other variables, while trend and efficacy have much lower correlations. The weak 
correlation between trend and efficacy indicates that whether climate change is happening and 
whether it is possible to do something about it, does not necessarily have that much to do with 
each other. The general weak correlations with trend could be connected with the uneven 
distribution of the values on the variable. For efficacy, a weakness and explanation for low 
correlations might be that the two values with largest frequencies are difficult to divide from 
each other for respondents, as they both indicate possibility for prevention, and only differ in 
difficulty. Thus, there might not be that large of a divide between which respondents answer 
the one or other. The variances between the correlations of personal and overall threat with 
the other variables seem to differ in level, though not structurally. They both correlate highest 
with attribution, and second highest policy. They also both correlate lowest with efficacy and 
second lowest with trend.  
 
To get a closer look at the correlations, the variables that are highest correlated with each 
other will be cross tabulated, and analysed the pair wise. The findings from cross tabulating 
attribution and personal threat, seen in table 3.4, are as expected. Most of the people who 
think that climate change is not a threat do not believe it is human caused. On the other four 
values on personal threat, most of the respondents believe that climate change is caused by 
human action. Of the respondents that do not accept attribution, a plurality view climate 
change as not very serious a threat to them personally. Among the respondents that accept 
attribution, a plurality thinks that climate change is somewhat serious.  
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Table 3.4: Cross tabulation of personal threat and attribution 
 
Personal threat 
 
 
Attribution 
 
 No Yes Total 
 
Not a threat 144 
20.6 % 
81 
4.9 % 
225 
9.5 % 
 
Not very serious 313 
44.7 % 
344 
20.7 % 
657 
27.8 % 
 
Somewhat serious 199 
28.4 % 
629 
37.9 % 
828 
35 % 
 
Serious 37 
5.3 % 
478 
28.8 % 
515 
21.8 % 
 
Very Serious 7 
1 % 
130 
7.8 % 
137 
5.8 % 
 
Total 700 
100 % 
1,662 
100 % 
2,362 
100 % 
 N=2319. Source: The Norwegian Citizen Panel (round 1) 2013 
 
 
Table 3.5 shows that the relationship between overall threat and attribution is, not 
surprisingly, similar to that between personal threat and attribution. A large majority of 
respondents who perceive climate change as ‘not a threat’ and ‘not very serious’, do not 
accept attribution. Even among those who believe climate change is ‘somewhat serious’, the 
majority does not believe that humans cause climate change. The respondents who regard 
climate change as serious and very serious mostly accept attribution. The largest share of the 
respondents who reject attribution perceive climate change as somewhat serious, while the 
largest share of the attribution acceptors view it as serious. This indicates that those who do 
not believe that climate change is caused by human action do not view it as a threat. Thus not 
only denying the cause of human action, but the problem in general.  
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Table 3.5: Cross tabulation of overall threat and attribution 
 
Overall threat 
 
Attribution 
 
 
 No Yes Total 
 
Not a threat 23 
3.3 % 
1 
0.1 % 
24 
1 % 
 
Not very serious 131 
18.9 % 
10 
0.6 % 
141 
6 % 
 
Somewhat serious 306 
44 % 
243 
14.9 % 
549 
23.7 % 
 
Serious 216 
31 % 
770 
47.4 % 
986 
42.5 % 
 
Very Serious 19 
2.7 % 
600 
36.7 % 
619 
26.7 % 
 
Total 695 
100 % 
1,624 
100 % 
2,319 
100 % 
 N=2319. Source: The Norwegian Citizen Panel (round 1) 2013 
 
 
The relationship between overall threat and policy shows an expected trend in table 3.6. 
Focusing on respondents that think Norway should produce less oil than currently, the share 
increases as we move from no threat to a very serious threat. The same goes for those who 
think that Norway should produce as much oil as currently up until ‘serious’.  Respondents 
who think that the country should produce more oil than currently also increase by moving to 
the right, but drop again after the middle point of ‘somewhat serious’. The plurality of 
respondents who opt for less oil views climate change as a very serious threat. Among the 
respondents who are satisfied with the current oil production, a plurality perceive climate 
change as serious, while most of the respondents who want to produce more oil think that 
climate change is somewhat serious. By looking at overall threat, most of the respondents 
who think that climate change is not a threat, think that we should produce as much or more 
oil than currently. Of those who view climate change as not very serious, somewhat serious 
and serious, a majority think that we should continue to produce as much oil as currently. 
Almost three fourths of those who perceive climate change as a very serious threat believe 
that we should produce less oil than currently. This indicates that people who perceive climate 
change as a threat overall support policies to deal with the threat. 
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Table 3.6: Cross tabulation of policy and overall threat 
 
Policy 
 
 
Overall threat 
 
 Not a threat Not very serious Somewhat serious Serious Very serious Total 
Less oil than 
currently 
4 
16.7 % 
16 
11.4 % 
128 
23.4 % 
412 
42.4 % 
457 
74 % 
1,017 
44.2 % 
 
As much oil 
as currently 
10 
41.7 % 
96 
68 % 
362 
66 % 
507 
52.2 % 
151 
24.5 % 
1,126 
48.9 % 
 
More oil than 
currently 
10 
41. 7 % 
29 
20.6 % 
58 
10.6 % 
52 
5.4 % 
9 
1.5 % 
158 
6.9 % 
 
Total 24 
100 % 
141 
100 % 
548 
100 % 
971 
100 % 
617 
100 % 
2,301 
100 % 
N=2301. Source: The Norwegian Citizen Panel (round 1) 2013 
 
3.5 Summarizing the dependent variables 
In this chapter, I have presented and discussed climate change attitudes in Norway. In general, 
climate change acceptance levels are high regarding trend, attribution and overall threat. 92 
per cent of the respondents believe that the climate is changing and 66 per cent believe that it 
is mainly caused by human action. There is a distinction for threat perception with higher 
levels for overall threat perception than for personal threat perception. 24 per cent of the 
respondents perceive climate change as a very serious threat overall, compared to only five 
per cent as a personal threat. When it comes to taking action, 60 per cent of the respondents 
think that it is possible, but very difficult to do anything to prevent harmful climate change. 
51 per cent think that Norway should continue to produce as much oil as currently. The six 
dependent variables are all significantly and positively correlated. The highest correlations are 
found between attribution and personal and overall threat, respectively, as well as for overall 
threat and policy. The descriptive statistics do not necessarily support the assumption that 
these six dependent variables can be divided into two dimensions, as the strongest correlations 
are found across these dimensions. However, the acceptance levels of the first dimension are 
all high, while the results of the second dimension are more debatable. In addition, the factors 
influencing climate change attitudes need to be analysed to look further at the division of the 
dependent variables. 
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4 Factors influencing climate change attitudes 
In this chapter, I will explain the methodological approach to my research question.  
Following, I will operationalize the independent variables that will be used in the regression 
analyses and present the descriptive statistics. Finally, I will conduct regression analyses for 
each dependent variable.  
 
4.1 Logistic regression 
The methodological approach for my research is quantitative, because it is a large-N study. In 
addition, a quantitative approach is necessary to measure effects across a large sample of 
observations and to be able to generalize (George & Bennett, 2005). When dependent 
variables are categorical or dichotomous, a regular linear regression is insufficient, because 
the outcome is non-linear. A dichotomous dependent variable violates many of the 
assumptions for linear regression. The error term does not satisfy the assumptions of 
normality. In addition, the variance of a dichotomous variable is not constant, creating 
instances of heteroscedasticity (Skog, 2004:360). Since two of my dependent variables are 
dichotomous and the remaining four are ordinal, I will apply logistic regression in the 
analysis4.  
 
  
                                                
4 When dependent variables are categorical, logistic regression and probit regression are the most used statistical 
techniques. The approaches are very similar, and differences in results are very small. The way of transforming 
the dependent variable and the forms of the regression curve are slightly different. However, the two models 
most often give similar results (Skog, 2004:390). Thus, selecting logistic regression ahead of probit regression 
should not affect the results of this thesis.  
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of linear versus non-linear relationship 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the curvilinear relationship of the logistic regression model and the 
linear relationship of the ordinary least squares regression model. The dotted line represents 
the linear model, while the S-shaped curvilinear line represents the logistic model. This curve 
represents the probability of an event occurring (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 
2006), and moves between values 0 and 1, but without reaching them. 
 
The implications of nonlinearity are fundamental to the proper interpretation of categorical 
regression models. The nonlinearity makes it more difficult to interpret the effects of the 
independent variables on the probability of an event occurring. The effect of a change in a 
variable depends on the value of all other variables in the nonlinear model (Long & Freese, 
2006:113-116). The results from logistic regressions can be estimated either as odds ratios or 
as logged odds. However, because the logistic regression model is nonlinear, no approach to 
interpretation can fully describe the relationship between a variable and the outcome (Long & 
Freese, 2006:157). The results in this thesis will instead be presented as predicted 
probabilities calculated from the logged odds.  
 
4.1.1 The binary model 
The logistic regression model with a binary outcome has a curvilinear S-shaped relationship. 
When the dependent variable is dichotomous and coded 0 and 1, the mean value will also be 
equal to the percentage with value 1 (Long & Freese, 2006). In this thesis, trend and 
attribution acceptance are dichotomous variables with binary outcomes.   
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Formally, the binary logit model can be written as  
 
In this equation, ε (error term) is assumed to be logistically distributed with Var(ε) = π2/3. For 
the binary regression model, Var(ε) must be assumed because the dependent variable is 
unobservable, unlike for the linear regression model. The value assumed for Var(ε) does not 
affect the value of the probability. Changing the assumed variance affects the spread of the 
distribution but not the proportion of the distribution above or below the threshold (0 and 1) 
(Long and Freese 2006: 134).  
 
4.1.2 The ordinal model 
When dependent variables are ordinal, normal logistic regression models are insufficient 
because they rely on S-shaped outcomes. Therefore, an ordinal logistic regression is 
necessary. In variables with ordinal outcomes, number of values is restricted, the categories 
can be ordered, but the distances between the categories are unknown (Long & Freese, 
2006:183). With ordinal outcomes it is applicable to use models that avoid the assumption 
that the distances between categories are equal. The ordinal regression model is nonlinear, and 
the magnitude of the change in the outcome probability for a given change in one of the 
independent variables depends on the levels of all the independent variables (Long & Freese, 
2006:183). In this theses, personal and overall threat perception, efficacy belief, and policy 
support are all variables with ordinal outcomes. 
 
The standard formula for the predicted probability in the ordinal regression model can be 
written as 
Pr (y = m ∣ χ) = F (τm − χβ) – F (τm−1 − χβ) 
 
Where F is the cdf for ε. In ordinal logit, F is logistic with Var(ε) =  π2/3. For y = 1, the 
second term on the right drops out because F (-∞- χβ) = 0, and for y = J, the first term equals 
F (∞- χβ) = 1. 
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One difference between the binary and ordinal regression models is that an intercept or 
constant is reported for the binary model, while the constant is replaced by a cut point in the 
ordinal model (Long & Freese, 2006:187). The ordinal cut point is equal but of opposite sign 
(direction) from the binary constant. This difference is due to how the models are identifies. 
However, the predicted probabilities are the same under either parameterization (Long & 
Freese, 2006:187). 
 
4.1.3 Model estimation 
Logistic regression uses maximum likelihood (ML) to estimate the models. ML estimates are 
the values of the parameters that have the maximum likelihood of generating the observed 
sample of data if the assumptions of the model are true. A likelihood function calculates “how 
likely it is that we would observe the data we actually observed if a given set of parameter 
estimates were the true parameters” (Long & Freese, 2006:76). In logistic regression analysis, 
the model estimation fit is measured by estimating the value of -2 times the log of the 
likelihood value (-2LL). The minimum value of -2LL is zero and refers to a perfect model fit. 
Thus, low values indicate that the model fits well, while large values indicate that the model 
fits poorly (Hair et al., 2006). In this thesis, likelihood ratio value (LR) will be presented. The 
LR test is based on the likelihood value of the model that has been estimated and a model 
based on the null hypothesis (H0). H0 claims that the probability of Y=1, in this case climate 
change attitudes, is the same regardless of the values on the independent variables (Long & 
Freese, 2006:88). A significant LR test indicates that the effect of the independent variable 
being equivalent to zero can be rejected. Another test for the null hypothesis is the Wald test. 
In this thesis, the Wald test is used for the separate blocks of variables in a three-block model 
in each regression model, while LR is used for the model as a whole. 
 
In addition to the likelihood tests, pseudo R2 and Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) are 
presented as measures of model fit. Pseudo R2 is also based on the -2LL and ranges from 0 to 
1, where 1 represents perfect fit (Hair et al., 2006). In this thesis, Mc Fadden’s R2 is used. 
This measure is known as the LR index and compares a model with just the intercept to a 
model with all the parameters (Long & Freese, 2006:109). AIC is calculated using the 
likelihood of the model and the number of parameters in the model. The model with the 
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lowest AIC, all else being equal, is considered the model with the best fit (Long & Freese, 
2006:112). 
 
Hypothesis tests of regression coefficients can be conducted through Wald or Likelihood 
Ratio (LR) tests. Statistical theory is unclear whether the LR or Wald test is to be preferred in 
models for categorical outcomes (Long & Freese, 2006:145). The z-test used in this thesis is a 
Wald test. The probability levels ordinarily reported are for two-tailed tests. The results in 
two-tailed tests correspond to the area of the curve that is either greater than the reported z or 
less than –z. When previous research or theory implies the sign of the coefficient, a one-tailed 
test can be used, and H0 is rejected only when z is in the expected tail. Only when the 
estimated coefficient is in the expected direction should P > z be divided (Long & Freese, 
2006:141).  
4.1.4 Assumptions and tests 
There are some assumptions necessary for the logistic regression models. For the binary 
model, the relationship between the variables must be S-shaped. The form of the regression 
curve can be calculated statistically by using the Hosmer-Lemeshow (H-L) test. A significant 
H-L test indicates that there are significant differences between actual and predicted values, 
and that the model is not S-shaped (Hair et al. 2005:372; Skog 2004:383-385). None of the 
binary variables in this thesis have a significant H-L test, so the curvilinear regression 
assumption is intact.  
 
For the ordinal model, the assumption of the parallel regression is implicit (Long & Freese, 
2006:197). Also known as the proportional odds assumption, it assumes that the slope 
coefficients are identical across each regression for each outcome. Probability curves thus 
differ only in being shifted to the left or right, but with the same form. An approximate LR 
test is used, comparing log likelihood from ordinal logistic regression with that from pooling 
binary models fitted with logistic regression. The proportionality of odds across response 
categories are LR tested. The parallel regression assumption cannot be rejected for the ordinal 
variables in this thesis.  
 
The second assumption concerns the error term, which should have independent variation 
(Skog, 2004:380). In most cases, this assumption is satisfied if the data have been selected 
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through random sample. The data in this thesis has been selected through random sample. 
The third assumption considers spuriousness. The relationship between dependent and 
independent variables should not be caused by underlying factors (Skog 2004: 380). The most 
important remedy for spuriousness is a solid theoretical foundation and operationalization of 
the variables included in the analysis. In addition to this, a multivariate model increases the 
reliability that the results are not spurious.  
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4.2 Independent variables 
In this part, the independent variables that were chosen based on previous literature and 
studies on factors influencing climate change opinion will be operationalized and presented. 
All variables are from the first round (2013) of the Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP).  
 
4.2.1 Trust in scientists 
Climate change is a complex phenomenon, and in addition to being a social and political 
issue, it is to a large degree built on science and facts. The public is being conveyed these 
scientific facts, and one prerequisite for accepting them might be trust in the scientific 
community Krosnick et al. (2006). I have used a question that asks respondents which level of 
confidence they have to the scientists (in general). The scale runs from very high mistrust to 
very high confidence on a seven-point scale restructured to vary from 0 to 1. Respondents 
who answered that they do not know, or who did not answer are left out of the analysis. The 
mean is .71, which indicates a relatively high degree of confidence in scientists among 
Norwegians.  
 
4.2.2 Political orientation  
The conceptualization of a political left in opposition to a political right is central in most 
democratic societies (Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Knutsen, 1995: 63; van Eijk et al., 2005), 
placing state-centred socialist parties on the left and market-centred conservative parties on 
the right. Normally, people who identify themselves with individualistic values, as opposed to 
collectivistic values, place themselves more to the right. The left-right axis is also a measure 
for the public-private dimension (Aardal, 2011). Political orientation on the left-right axis is 
used as a measure for worldview. Respondents were informed, “in politics one often speaks of 
the “left wing” and “right wing.”” They were then asked to place themselves on a scale from 
0 to 10, from far left to far right, where the higher the value, the more to the right. The 
variable thus measures political orientation towards the right. I have restructured this variable 
to go from 0 to 1 for comparison reasons. The mean is .53, thus leaning slightly to the right. A 
majority of the respondents place themselves around the middle.  
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4.2.3 Party vote: FrP 
Party vote is another measure of political orientation and ideology. The Progress Party or 
Fremskrittspartiet (FrP) is the furthest to the right in the Norwegian multi-party system, and 
has since 2013 been in government together with the largest conservative right-wing party, 
Høyre (H). FrP-voters have in previous research been characterized differently than other 
Norwegian voters (Austgulen & Stø, 2013), and FrP is the only party in Parliament 
(Stortinget) to officially be uncertain about climate change (Tjernshaugen, Aardal, & 
Gullberg, 2011:339). The party has shifted slightly in their view on climate change the recent 
years, by stating that science shows anthropogenic climate change in the party program for 
2013-2017 (FrP, 2013). However, FrP stresses that there is great uncertainty about how much 
of the climate changes are due to human action, compared to natural climate variability. 
 
Austgulen and Stø (2013) found that FrP-voters are the most climate change sceptical among 
Norwegian respondents. To test this, I will use a question asking respondents what party they 
voted for in the last election (2013). I constructed a dummy variable with FrP voters valued 1, 
and all other party voters valued 0. Because FrP is the furthest to the right in the Norwegian 
political context, and identifies with a right-wing individualistic ideology, this variable will 
control for what effect FrP voters have, while testing the left-right axis. The mean is .13, 
indicating that about 13 per cent of the respondents voted for FrP in 2013. In the election, FrP 
got 16.3 per cent of the votes (KMD, 2013), so the sample deviates slightly from the 
population. 
 
4.2.4 Employment in the oil and gas industry 
The unique context of the Norwegian case is the dominant role played by the oil and gas 
industry, both in society and for the economy. About eight per cent of Norwegian jobs are 
directly or indirectly connected to the demand from the oil and gas sector (Eika et al., 2010). 
Fossil fuel dominates the country’s energy sector (Tvinnereim & Austgulen, 2014:323). 
Tvinnereim and Austgulen (2014) analysed how close affiliation to this industry through work 
influences attitudes towards climate change. They found that working in the oil and gas 
industry has an effect on climate change opinion with oil and gas workers being more likely 
to form sceptical opinions on climate change. This effect remained when controlling for the 
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demographic variables age, gender, education and income, as well as for ideology 
(Tvinnereim & Austgulen, 2014:326).   
 
For my analysis, I will use a question asking respondents whether their workplace is in the oil 
and gas sector, or closely related to it. I created a dummy variable where respondents who 
answer that their workplace is in or closely related to the oil and gas industry are valued 1, 
and those who answer no are valued 0. The mean is .1, indicating that about ten per cent of 
the respondents work closely affiliated to the oil and gas industry. About half of these stated 
that they work in the oil and gas sector, and half that they work closely related to the sector. 
They are, still, all affiliated and interact with the oil and gas sector, so it should not pose a 
problem to combine them. The expectation that working closely to the industry influences 
climate change opinion should apply to both. 
 
4.2.4 Higher education 
Education is used as an indirect measure of knowledge (Franzen & Meyer, 2010). Education 
is in this thesis measured in three categories (elementary, high school, and college/university) 
and tested for significance against each other. Higher education is the category which holds 
effect, and is therefore used as a dummy variable for education in the analysis. This supports 
the theoretical foundation outlined previously. Higher education is valued 1, while all lower 
levels or no education is valued 0. The mean is .53, indicating that around half of the 
respondents have achieved some form of higher education.  
 
4.2.5 Demographic variables 
In addition to these independent variables, it is necessary to control for the effect of common 
demographic variables. Gender is one of these control variables. In previous research, men 
have been found to be more sceptical and less fearful towards climate change than women 
(Kahan et al., 2007; Kellstedt et al., 2008; McCright & Dunlap, 2011a). I created a dummy 
variable for gender, giving the value 1 for female and 0 for male, thus measuring the effect of 
being female on climate change attitudes. The mean is .5, indicating that women and men are 
equally represented.   
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Age is measured as categories to test for the generation effect. After testing the categories 
against each other, it is evident that it is the oldest age category that has any effect on climate 
change attitudes, which is consistent with previous research. I construct a dummy variable 
called senior, valuing respondents who are 60 and older as 1, and the rest as 0.  The mean is 
.25, indicating that about one fourth of the respondents are seniors.  
  
Income is tested as a continuous variable. Income is measured through asking respondents to 
state their current (individual) income. The values range from 0 to 850 000 NOK, but are 
recoded to count as 100 thousands, thus ranging from 0 to 85. The mean is 4.6, indicating that 
the average respondent has an income of 460 000 NOK.   
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of the independent variables 
 
Variable 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Std.Err. 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
Senior 4905 .25 .01 0 1 
 
Female 4905 .5 .01 0 1 
 
Higher education 4469 .53 .01 0 1 
 
Oil and gas employment 2866 .1 .01 0 1 
 
Income in 100 000 4126 4.6 .06 0 85 
 
Trust in scientists 4536 .71 .00 0 1 
 
Political Orientation 4576 .53 .00 0 1 
 
FrP 4140 .13 .01 0 1 
 
Source: The Norwegian Citizen Panel (round 1) 2013 
 
Table 4.1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables. The 
N ranges from 2866 for oil and gas employment to 4905 for age and gender. All variables, 
except for income, are measured with minimal values 0 and maximum values 1.  
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4.3 Regression models 
The logistic regression models in this thesis are organized step wise, with the independent and 
control variables divided into three blocks. The division and order are based on causation with 
a natural order. The first block consists of the socioeconomic variables age, gender, education, 
employment in the oil and gas industry and income. The two following blocks consists of 
political variables on the one hand, and trust in scientists on the other hand. For the scientific 
related dependent variables trend and attribution acceptance and overall threat perception, 
trust in scientists is in the second block and political orientation and FrP vote is in the third 
block. For the political dependent variables personal threat perception, efficacy belief and 
policy support, the political variables are in the second block and trust in the third block. Each 
dependent variable is tested in three models with the same N. The first model contains the 
first block, while the second model includes the second block, as well as the first. The third 
model consists of all three blocks. I report the results of significance and direction of effect on 
the independent variables, as well as the significance and explanatory power of the three 
blocks and models for each dependent variable through Wald and LR tests. 
 
Because the coefficients in logistic regressions do not tell us much other than the direction of 
the effects, predicted probabilities will be used to interpret the effects of the main independent 
variables, political orientation and trust in scientists. The predicted probabilities are based on 
the regression models that include all independent and control variables, holding all variables, 
except for the one predicting probabilities, at mean levels. For the dependent variables with 
only one outcome (dummy variables), the predicted probabilities are measured for the 
outcome (1). On the ordinal variables with different outcomes, predicted probabilities are 
measured for all outcomes, but illustrated graphically for the outcome of value 1, which 
indicates full acceptance or highest positive attitudes on all dependent variables. 
 
4.3.1 Trend acceptance  
It is clear from the descriptive statistics that trend acceptance in Norway is high, with 92 per 
cent of respondents believing that the climate is changing. Accordingly there is little variation 
to explain on this variable. Thus, I expect not to find any strong effects of the independent 
variables. 
  
  
 
64 
Table 4.2: Factors explaining trend acceptance 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Senior .58 
(.31) 
.62* 
(.31) 
.61 
(.31) 
 
Female .27 
(.19) 
.24 
(.19) 
.22 
(.19) 
 
Higher education .35 
(.18) 
.31 
(.19) 
.3 
(.19) 
 
Oil and gas (employment) .04 
(.28) 
.02 
(.28) 
.06 
(.28) 
 
Income (100 000) -.04** 
(.02) 
-.04* 
(.02) 
-.04* 
(.02) 
 
Trust in scientists 
 
 1.02* 
(.02) 
.97(*) 
(.5) 
 
Political orientation (left-right)   -.65 
(.44) 
 
FrP   .18 
(.29) 
 
Constant 2.56*** 
(.18) 
1.97*** 
(.37) 
2.23*** 
(.47) 
Wald chi2 block 15.94** 4.32 2.19* 
LR chi2 model 15.59** 19.73** 21.92** 
Pseudo R2 .0153 .0194 .0215 
N=2179. Standard errors reported in parentheses.5 ***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05;  
(*)p-value<.05 in one-tailed test 
 
As expected, there are little significant effects on trend acceptance in the regression model in 
table 4.2. Trust in scientists has an effect on the 5 per cent-level in model two. When the 
political variables are controlled for, the effect is only significant in a one-tailed test6. The 
Wald chi-square test indicates that the first, socioeconomic, block is significant and explains 
the most. The second, political, block is insignificant and the third, trust, block is only 
significant at the lowest level. The models are all significant, but the first block explains the 
most, according to the LR chi-square test. 
                                                
5Standard errors higher than 2 can indicate multicollinearity between the independent variables. None of the 
standard errors are high enough to be problematic, and will thus not be discussed further. 
6The effect is insignificant in a two-tailed test, but significant in a one-tailed test. One-tailed tests can be 
conducted if the theoretical assumptions of the direction of the effect of the independent variable is strong(Long 
& Freese, 2006:141). In this thesis, significant one-tailed tests will be reported for the main independent 
variables when the effect is insignificant in a two-tailed test.  
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These results indicate that political orientation does not explain trend acceptance in Norway, 
while trust in scientists has some explanatory power. The socioeconomic control variables, 
except for income, do also not explain the variation. This might be due to the small variance 
on the trend variable, as there are not a lot of respondents who do not believe the climate is 
changing, and thus not that many to be accounted for with explanations.  
 
4.3.2 Attribution acceptance 
The distribution for attribution acceptance, as seen in the descriptive statistics, was more 
varied. In line with the theoretical framework, I expect that trust in scientists explain most of 
attribution acceptance.  
 
Table 4.3: Factors explaining attribution acceptance 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Senior -.04 
(.15) 
.04 
(.15) 
.03 
(.16) 
 
Female .74*** 
(.11) 
.69*** 
(.11) 
.58*** 
(.12) 
 
Higher education .99*** 
(.1) 
.93*** 
(.11) 
.78*** 
(.11) 
 
Oil and gas -.42** 
(.15) 
-.48** 
(.16) 
-.22 
(.16) 
 
Income (100 000) -.03* 
(.01) 
-.03* 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.01) 
 
Trust in scientists   2.28*** 
(.29) 
1.93*** 
(.31) 
 
Political orientation (left-right)   -2.98*** 
(.28) 
 
FrP   -.53** 
(.16) 
 
Constant .36** 
(.11) 
-1.21*** 
(.19) 
.81** 
(.29) 
Wald chi2 block 170.55*** 60.18*** 164.36*** 
LR chi2 model 187.23*** 248.39*** 434.10*** 
Pseudo R2 .0736 .0977 .1707 
N=2179. Standard errors reported in parentheses.  ***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05  
  
 
66 
The results from the regression in table 4.3 show a lot more effects on attribution acceptance 
than found on trend. In the first model with the socioeconomic variables, all variables have 
significant effects on attribution acceptance, except for senior. Female and higher education 
have a highly significant positive effect. Oil and gas and income, on the other hand, have 
negative significant effects on attribution. In model 2, trust in scientists is included. The 
effects of the socioeconomic variables remain significant when accounting for trust. Trust in 
scientists, for its part, has a highly significant positive effect on attribution acceptance. Hence, 
people who are more trusting of scientists are more likely to accept anthropogenic climate 
change. Political orientation and FrP vote are included in the third model. Both political 
variables have negative effects on attribution acceptance that are highly significant. This 
indicates that as people place themselves more to the right on the left-right axis, they become 
less likely to accept anthropogenic climate change. Voting for FrP also decreases the 
likelihood of accepting attribution. When including the political variables, the effect of oil and 
gas employment and income becomes insignificant. All three blocks and models are highly 
significant, but the second block of trust in scientists explains the least. This block does, 
however, only consist of one variable. To be able to compare the effects of trust in scientists 
and political orientation, the predicted probabilities for the outcome (attribution 
acceptance=1) to occur are presented. 
 
Figure 4.2: Predicted probabilities for 
trust in scientists on attribution 
acceptance (95% Cls) 
Figure 4.3: Predicted probabilities for 
political orientation on attribution 
acceptance (95% Cls) 
 
  
 
.4
.6
.8
1
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 p
ro
ba
bil
ity
 (A
ttr
ibu
tio
n)
0 .17 .33 .5 .67 .83 1
Trust in scientists
.4
.6
.8
1
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 p
ro
ba
bil
ity
 (A
ttr
ibu
tio
n)
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Political orientation
  
 
67 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the predicted probabilities for trust in scientists, on the left, and 
political orientation, on the right, on attribution acceptance. The figures demonstrate the 
distribution from the lowest (0) to the highest (1) values on the independent variables. The 
graph for trust in scientists moves upwards the left to right, while the graph for political 
orientation moves downwards from left to right. This means that the probability of accepting 
attribution increases with an increase in value on trust in scientists, but decreases with an 
increase in value on political orientation. Said in different words, the probability of believing 
that climate change is mostly caused by human action is higher the more people trust 
scientists, as well as the more to the left people place themselves on the political scale.  
 
Though the directions of the graphs are opposite, the variations of the distributions are 
approximately the same. However, the graph for political orientation goes slightly higher, and 
the confidence intervals (the grey area) are larger for trust in scientists. These probabilities 
should be seen in light of the previous finding that 66 per cent of respondents accept 
anthropogenic climate change.  
 
In figure 4.1, the predicted probabilities of accepting attribution range from 45.9 to 85.4 per 
cent, varying with around 40 percentage points. Thus trust in scientists explains a great deal of 
the variance on attribution. The predicted probabilities for political orientation presented in 
figure 4.2 range from 45.4 to 94.3 per cent, varying with about 50 percentage points. The 
variance of political orientation is even larger than the variance of trust. Hence, although trust 
in scientists and political orientation explain a lot of the variance of attribution, political 
orientation explains the most. It should be noted though, that the variables are slightly 
different from one another with eleven values for political orientation and seven values for 
trust in scientists.  
 
The confidence intervals show the dispersion of probability on the values of the independent 
variables with 95 per cent certainty. For trust in scientists, the confidence interval ranges from 
35 to 57 per cent on value 1 (46 per cent), which is 22 percentage points. For political 
orientation, the largest confidence interval is found on value 1, ranging from 39 to 51 per cent, 
only half the size of the largest interval for trusts in scientists.   
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The lower half of trust in scientists represents degrees of mistrust, while the upper half is 
degrees of confidence. .5 is neither mistrust nor confidence. The probabilities for mistrust lie 
between 46 and 62 per cent, while the probabilities for confidence lie between 75 and 85 per 
cent. Hence, the variation of probability is larger within the degrees of mistrust, than within 
the degrees of trust.  
 
For political orientation, if the values are divided in two halves, the lower half is left and the 
upper half is right. The probabilities for left vary between 83 and 94 per cent, while the 
variation of probabilities for right goes from 45 to 73 per cent. Thus, the variation is a lot 
larger on the values for right than for left. This indicates that how far left people place 
themselves on the political scale does not matter that much for the probability of accepting 
anthropogenic climate change, but it matters that they place themselves more to the left than 
to the right. However, how far to the right people place themselves does matter for the 
probability of accepting anthropogenic climate change, in addition to being on the right hand 
side in general. On an eleven point scale, being on the eleventh point, the furthest to the right, 
decreases the probability of accepting attribution with eight percentage points from the second 
furthest (the tenth point). This indicates that there is a larger variation on the right than on the 
left. 
 
4.3.3 Overall threat perception 
Overall threat perception is the third dependent variable in the first, scientific related 
dimension. In contrast to the previously tested climate change variables, overall threat 
perception has ordinal outcomes. The results of the ordinal regression are presented in table 
4.4. 
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Table 4.4: Factors explaining overall threat perception 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Senior -.13 
(.16) 
-.01 
(.17) 
-.07 
(.17) 
 
Female .4** 
(.12) 
.36** 
(.12) 
.23 
(.12) 
 
Higher education .82*** 
(.12) 
.76*** 
(.12) 
.61*** 
(.13) 
 
Oil and gas -.66*** 
(.18) 
-.66*** 
(.18) 
-.38* 
(.19) 
 
Income (100 000) -.01 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.02) 
.00 
(.02) 
 
Trust in scientists  2.24*** 
(.35) 
1.82*** 
(.35) 
 
Political orientation (left-right)   -2.93*** 
(.3) 
 
FrP   -.4 
(.21) 
Wald chi2 block 88.97*** 41.49*** 122.27*** 
LR chi2 model 92.07*** 263.41*** 263.41*** 
Pseudo R2 .0334 .0488 .0956 
N=1101. Standard errors reported in parentheses.  ***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05 
 
In the first model with socioeconomic and demographic variables, female, higher education 
and oil and gas employment have significant effects on overall threat perception. Female and 
higher education have positive effects, while oil and gas employment has a negative effect. 
When including the trust variable in the second model, the effects remain significant. Trust in 
scientists has a highly significant positive effect on overall threat perception. Respondents 
who report higher levels of trust in scientists are more likely to perceive climate change as a 
serious threat. 
 
Political variables are included in the third model. Political orientation has a highly significant 
negative effect on overall threat, but FrP does not have a significant effect. This indicates that 
people placing themselves more to the right on the left-right axis are less likely to perceive 
climate change as a serious threat overall. All three blocks and models are highly significant, 
however the third block with political orientation explain the most of the variance on overall 
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threat. To compare the effects of trust in scientists and political orientation on overall threat 
perception, I use predicted probabilities. 
Figure 4.4: Predicted probabilities for 
trust in scientists on overall threat (95% 
Cls) 
Figure 4.5: Predicted probabilities for 
political orientation on overall threat 
(95% Cls) 
 
 
 
The predicted probabilities presented in figure 4.3 and 4.4 demonstrate the distribution of trust 
in scientists and political orientation, respectively, from the lowest (0) to the highest values 
(1) when overall threat=1. As for attribution, the graphs go in opposite directions. The 
probability of overall threat perception increases with increase in trust level, and decreases 
with values more to the right on the political scale. The predicted probabilities of overall 
threat perception at the highest value range from 7.2 to 32.6 per cent for trust in scientists. For 
political orientation, the predicted probabilities of overall threat perception at the highest 
value range from 6.8 to 57.6 per cent. Accordingly, the variation is larger for political 
orientation than for trust in scientists.  
 
As illustrated in the descriptive statistics in the previous chapter, 24 per cent of respondents 
perceive climate change as a ‘very serious’ overall threat (1). The further the probabilities 
vary from these results, the more they explain of the variation in the dependent variable. High 
confidence is the value for trust in scientists that lies closest to 24 per cent probability. Thus, 
respondents with mistrust (further away from high confidence) stand the most out. For 
political orientation, the middle value consists of 24 per cent probability. However, the 
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distance to the probabilities for the left values is larger than the distance to the right values’ 
probabilities, indicating that the left values explain the most.  
 
Because overall threat perception is a variable with ordinal outcomes, I have included 
predicted probabilities for all five outcomes on the lowest (0) and highest (1) values of trust in 
scientists and political orientation. Only one per cent of all respondents believed it were not a 
threat (0), while seven per cent found it not very serious (.25). Around 26 per cent perceived 
climate change as a somewhat serious threat (.5) and 42 per cent answered as serious (.75).  
 
Table 4.5: Predicted probabilities for trust in scientists on overall threat 
 
Overall threat 
 
Trust in scientists=0 
 
Trust in scientists=1 
 
0 1.2 % .2 % 
.25 13.2 % 2.4 % 
.5 44.8 % 16.3 % 
.75 33.6 % 48.5 % 
1 7.2% 32.6 % 
 
Table 4.5 shows the predicted probabilities for trust in scientists on all five values of overall 
threat. The difference in predicted probabilities between the lowest and highest values of trust 
in scientists ranges from one to 25.4 percentage points, thus explaining a great deal of the 
variance. The probability of perceiving overall threat as not a threat (0) is closer to the 
percentage of the general distribution for respondents on the lowest value of trust, than for 
those on the highest value of trust. When climate change is perceived as not very serious (.25) 
the predicted probabilities for the lowest and highest values of trust in scientists are about the 
same distance from the distribution independent of other factors. The probability of 
perceiving climate change as a somewhat serious threat (.5), is closer to the statistics when 
trust in scientists is at the highest level. When climate change is perceived as serious (.75) the 
probability for the highest level of trust is closer to the overall distribution, than the 
probability for the lowest level of trust. Thus, the mistrust value stands out the most and 
explains a lot of the variance in overall threat perception. 
 
  
  
 
72 
Table 4.6: Predicted probabilities for political orientation on overall threat 
 
Overall threat 
 
Left=0 
 
Right=1 
 
0 .1 % 13 % 
.25 .9 % 13.9 % 
.5 6.7 % 45.5 % 
.75 34.7 % 32.5 % 
1 57.6% 6.8 % 
 
Table 4.6 shows the predicted probabilities for political orientation on all five values of 
overall threat. The difference in predicted probabilities between the lowest and highest values 
of political orientation ranges from 12.9 to 50.8 percentage points, explaining a lot of the 
variance. The probability of perceiving overall threat as not a threat (0) is closer to the 
percentage of the general distribution for respondents on the value furthest to the left, than for 
those furthest to the right. When climate change is perceived as not very serious (.25) the 
predicted probabilities for the lowest and highest values of political orientation are about the 
same distance from the distribution independent of other factors. The probability of 
perceiving climate change as a somewhat serious threat (.5), is also about the same distance 
from the statistics for both values. When climate change is perceived as serious (.75) the 
probability for left is closer to the overall distribution, than the probability for right. Thus, the 
left and right values both stand out and explain a lot of the variance, on different values of 
overall threat perception. 
 
After interpreting the predicted probabilities, it seems that political orientation explains most 
of the variances of overall threat perception. Trust in scientists also explains a great deal. In 
general, the highest variances were found among those who perceived overall threat as a very 
serious threat. 
 
4.3.4 Personal threat perception 
Personal threat perception is the first dependent variable in the political dimension. The 
expectation for this dimension is that political orientation has a significant effect on the 
climate change attitudes, and is thus placed in the second block, with trust in scientists 
following in order and importance. 
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Table 4.7: Factors explaining personal threat perception 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Senior .22 
(.16) 
.26 
(.16) 
.27 
(.16) 
 
Female .68*** 
(.12) 
.63*** 
(.12) 
.61*** 
(.12) 
 
Higher education .5*** 
(.12) 
.27* 
(.12) 
.26* 
(.12) 
 
Oil and gas -.14 
(.19) 
.01 
(.19) 
-.02 
(.19) 
 
Income (100 000) .02 
(.02) 
.04* 
(.02) 
.04* 
(.02) 
 
Political orientation (left-right)  -1.77*** 
(.27) 
-1.76*** 
(.27) 
 
FrP  -.72*** 
(.19) 
-.68*** 
(.19) 
 
Trust in scientists   .67(*) 
(.35) 
Wald chi2 block 63.04*** 80.81*** 3.73 
LR chi2 model 64.53*** 148.12*** 151.85*** 
Pseudo R2 .0211 .0485 .0497 
N=1090. Standard errors reported in parentheses.  ***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05 
(*)p-value<.05 in one-tailed test 
 
In the first model including socioeconomic factors, female and higher education are the only 
two variables with significant and positive effects on personal threat perception. The two 
political variables included in the second model have highly significant negative effects on 
personal threat perception. This indicates that respondents with political orientation towards 
the right, as well as FrP voters are less likely to perceive climate change as a personal threat. 
When the political variables are included in the model, income has a borderline significant 
positive effect on personal threat perception. Female and higher education are still significant 
in the second model, although the significance level for higher education’s effect has 
decreased. The third model includes trust in scientists, which only has a significant effect on 
personal threat perception in a one-tailed test. The effects from the second model stay 
unchanged in regards to significance. The third block is insignificant in the chi-square test, 
but the first and second blocks are highly significant, as well as all three models. The political 
block explains the most, according to the Wald test.  
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Figure 4.6: Predicted probabilities for 
political orientation on personal threat 
(95% Cls) 
Figure 4.7: Predicted probabilities for 
trust in scientists on personal threat 
(95% Cls) 
 
 
 
The predicted probabilities presented in figure 4.5 demonstrate the distribution for political 
orientation from the left (0) to the right (1) when personal threat=1. The predicted probability 
of personal threat perception at the highest value ranges from 1.7 to nine per cent. On the 
other hand, figure 4.6 shows that the predicted probabilities for trust in scientists on personal 
threat only vary between two and five per cent. Since trust in scientists only was significant in 
a one-tailed test, the difference in variation in the two graphs is not surprising. The difference 
in direction of the graphs remains the same as seen for the previous dependent variables, with 
political orientation going downward and trust in scientists upward.  
 
Only five per cent of the respondents believed climate change to be a ‘very serious’ (1) 
personal threat. Around 20 per cent found it serious (.75), while 35 per cent believed it as 
somewhat serious (.5). 29 per cent believed climate change to be ‘not very serious’ (.25), and 
eleven per cent did not think it was a threat (0). Table 4.8 shows the predicted probabilities for 
political orientation on all five values of personal threat. 
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Table 4.8: Predicted probabilities for political orientation on personal threat 
 
Personal threat 
 
Political orientation=0 
 
Political orientation=1 
 
0 2.7 % 14 % 
.25 15.6 % 42.6 % 
.5 38 % 31.6 % 
.75 34.6 % 10.1 % 
1 9 % 1.7 % 
 
The largest variance of around 27 percentage points is found when personal threat is 
perceived as not very serious (.25). The difference in predicted probabilities between the 
lowest and highest value of political orientation ranges from 7.3 to 27 percentage points, thus 
explaining some of the variance. In general, the far left value stands most out at thus explains 
more than the far right. 
 
Table 4.9: Predicted probabilities for trust in scientists on personal threat 
 
Personal threat 
 
Trust in scientists=0 
 
Trust in scientists=1 
 
0 10.2 % 5.5 % 
.25 37.5 % 26.3 % 
.5 36.3 % 41 % 
.75 13.7 % 22.7 % 
1 2.4 % 4.6 % 
 
The variances of the predicted probabilities for trust in scientists are, as seen in table 4.9, 
much smaller than those for political orientation. The difference in predicted probabilities 
between the lowest and highest value of trust in scientists ranges from 4.7 to 11.2 percentage 
points.  
 
Comparing the predicted probabilities between political orientation and trust in scientists has 
illustrated that trust in scientists has a small effect on personal threat perception, while 
political orientation has a larger effect. The largest variance is found when personal threat is 
perceived as not very serious.  
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4.3.5 Efficacy belief 
The second dependent variable on the political dimension is belief in the possibility of 
prevention, efficacy. The expectation is that political orientation has a large effect and 
explains more of the variation than does trust in scientists.  
 
Table 4.10: Factors explaining efficacy belief 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Senior .01 
(.13) 
.02 
(.13) 
.05 
(.13) 
 
Female .48*** 
(.09) 
.44*** 
(.09) 
.42*** 
(.09) 
 
Higher education .25** 
(.1) 
.17 
(.1) 
.15 
(.1) 
 
Oil and gas -.49** 
(.16) 
-.41* 
(.16) 
-.43** 
(.16) 
 
Income (100 000) -.03* 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.01) 
 
Political orientation (left-right)  -.68** 
(.22) 
-.64** 
(.22) 
 
FrP  -.37* 
(.17) 
-.33 
(.17) 
 
Trust in scientists   .87** 
(.28) 
Wald chi2 block 66.31*** 20.69*** 9.61** 
LR chi2 model 68.09*** 89.18*** 98.89*** 
Pseudo R2 .0190 .0249 .0276 
N=2087. Standard errors reported in parentheses.  ***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05 
 
In the first model, all demographic and socioeconomic variables except for senior have 
significant effects on efficacy belief. Female and higher education have positive effects, while 
oil and gas employment and income have negative effects on efficacy belief. When the 
political variables are included in the second model, higher education and income lose their 
significant effects. Political orientation and FrP both have significant negative effects on 
efficacy belief. This indicates that people who place themselves to the right on the left-right 
axis, and people who vote FrP, are less likely to believe that something can be done to prevent 
climate change impacts. In the third model, trust in scientists is included with a positive 
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significant effect on efficacy belief. Thus, trusting scientists increases the likelihood of 
accepting that something can be done. FrP loses the significant effect in the third model, while 
the other variables’ effects remain. The first two blocks are highly significant, while the third 
is significant on a lower level. All models are highly significant. The first block, with the 
socioeconomic variables, explain the most on efficacy belief. The second, political, block 
explains more than the third block, according to the Wald tests. To compare the effects of the 
two main independent variables more thoroughly, the predicted probabilities are reported. 
 
Figure 4.8: Predicted probabilities for 
political orientation on efficacy belief 
(95% Cls) 
Figure 4.9: Predicted probabilities for 
trust in scientists on efficacy belief (95% 
Cls) 
 
  
 
The predicted probabilities presented in figure 4.7 demonstrate the distribution for political 
orientation from left (0) to right (1) when efficacy belief=1. The predicted probabilities 
presented in figure 4.8 demonstrate the distribution for trust in scientists from the lowest (0) 
to the highest (1) values when efficacy belief=1. The graphs have the same directions as 
previously seen for the other dependent variables. However, the difference in the steepness of 
the two graphs is small. The predicted probabilities for political orientation range from .6 to 
1.1 per cent, while the predicted probabilities for trust in scientists range from .4 to one per 
cent. Thus, the probability of respondents believing that it is easy to do something to prevent 
harmful climate change (1) is around one per cent regardless of the placement on the left-right 
axis and the degree of trust in scientists.  
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It is necessary to bear in mind that only around two per cent of the respondents, when 
controlled for demographic variables, believed efficacy to be easy. 32 per cent believed it to 
be possible and completely realistic (.67), 60 per cent believed it to be possible, but very 
difficult (.33) and six per cent believed it to be impossible to do something (0). Thus it should 
be interesting to discuss the predicted probabilities for political orientation and trust in 
scientists on efficacy belief on the other outcomes, as well. 
 
Table 4.11: Predicted probabilities for political orientation on efficacy belief 
Efficacy belief 
 
Left=0 
 
Right=1 
 
0 3.3 % 6 % 
.33 56.1 % 67.5 % 
.67 39.5 % 25.8 % 
1 1.1 % .6 % 
 
Table 4.11 shows the predicted probabilities for political orientation on all four values of 
efficacy belief. The largest variance of around 14 percentage points is found when efficacy is 
seen as possible and completely realistic (.67). The difference in predicted probabilities 
between left and right ranges from .5 to 13.7 percentage points, explaining some of the 
variance. Respondents who place themselves towards the right on the left-right axis are less 
likely to believe that it is easy or completely realistic and more likely to believe that it is very 
difficult or impossible to prevent harmful climate changes, compared to those who place 
themselves towards the left. The far left value deviates the most from the statistics of 
respondents who view efficacy as impossible. The far right value deviates the most from the 
general distribution for possible, but completely realistic as well as easy. The distance to the 
statistics for possible, but very difficult is about the same for both the far left and far right 
values.  
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Table 4.12: Predicted probabilities for trust in scientists on efficacy belief 
Efficacy belief 
 
Trust in scientists=0 
 
Trust in scientists=1 
 
0 8.1 % 3.6 % 
.33 71.2 % 58.1 % 
.67 20.3 % 37.3 % 
1 .4 % 1 % 
 
Table 4.12 shows the predicted probabilities for trust in scientists on all four values of 
efficacy belief. The largest variance of 17 percentage points is found when efficacy is seen as 
possible and completely realistic (.67). The difference in predicted probabilities between the 
lowest and highest values on trust in scientists ranges from .6 to 17 percentage points, 
explaining a little more of the variance, than political orientation. Respondents who trust 
scientists are more likely to believe that something can be done to prevent harmful climate 
changes. 
 
After interpreting the predicted probabilities, it seems that political orientation and trust in 
scientists explain parts of the variances of efficacy belief. In general, the highest variances 
were found among those who believe it is possible and completely realistic to do something to 
prevent harmful climate changes. Trust in scientists have more varied probabilities, but the 
difference is marginal, so it is not possible to rank them.  
 
4.3.6 Policy support 
The last dependent variable on the second dimension of climate change attitudes is policy 
support. The expectation is that political orientation has a significant effect and explains more 
than trust in scientists. The results are presented in table 4.13. 
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Table 4.13: Factors explaining policy support 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Senior .31* 
(.13) 
.36** 
(.13) 
.4** 
(.13) 
 
Female .54*** 
(.09) 
.45*** 
(.09) 
.43*** 
(.09) 
 
Higher education .66*** 
(.09) 
.45*** 
(.1) 
.42*** 
(.1) 
 
Oil and gas -1.12*** 
(.15) 
-.89*** 
(.15) 
-.92*** 
(.15) 
 
Income (100 000) -.03** 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
 
Political orientation (left-right)  -3.42*** 
(.23) 
-3.39*** 
(.23) 
 
FrP  -.22 
(.16) 
-.16 
(.16) 
 
Trust in scientists   1.13*** 
(.27) 
Wald chi2 block 195.43*** 262.48*** 17.23*** 
LR chi2 model 208.46*** 502.43*** 519.77*** 
Pseudo R2 .0538 .1296 .1341 
N=2177. Standard errors reported in parentheses.  ***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05 
 
In the first model, all the demographic and socioeconomic variables have significant effects 
on policy support. Senior, female and higher education have positive effects on policy 
support. Oil and gas employment and income, on the other hand, have negative significant 
effects on policy support. When including the political variables in the second model, the 
effect of income loses significance, but the other variables remain significant. Political 
orientation has a negative significant effect on policy support, which indicates that the more to 
the right respondents affiliate themselves, the less likely they are to want Norway to produce 
less oil. FrP has no significant effect on policy support. In the third model, trust in scientists is 
included in the regression. Trust in scientists has a positive significant effect on policy 
support, indicating that the more respondents trust scientists, the more likely they are to 
accept a reduction in oil production. The other variables remain significant in the third model, 
after including trust in scientists. Every block and model is highly significant, with the 
second, political, block holding the highest explanation.  
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Figure 4.10: Predicted probabilities for 
political orientation on policy support 
(95% Cls) 
Figure 4.11: Predicted probabilities for 
trust in scientists on policy support 
(95% Cls) 
  
 
Figure 4.9 and 4.10 demonstrate the predicted probabilities for political orientation from left 
(0) to right (1) and trust in scientists from the lowest (0) to the highest (1) values when policy 
support is at the highest value (1). As for the other climate change variables, the graph for 
political orientation goes downwards from left to right, while trust in scientists goes upwards. 
The predicted probabilities of wanting Norway to produce less oil range from 12.3 to 80.7 per 
cent for political orientation and 23.9 to 49.2 per cent for trust in scientists. This illustrates a 
larger effect of political orientation, as the probabilities vary more between the values than for 
trust in scientists.  
 
The descriptive statistics in chapter 3 showed that 42 per cent of the respondents answered 
that Norway should produce less oil than currently (1). For the trust variable, the predicted 
probabilities of the higher values of confidence are closer to the 42 per cent, than are mistrust 
values. For political orientation, the middle value is the closest to the overall 42 per cent. The 
distance from the probability at the middle level is larger to the far left value than to the far 
right level, indicating that the left values have the largest effects. For the other values on 
policy support, 51 per cent thought Norway should maintain current levels (.5) and seven per 
cent thought Norway should increase production (0). 
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Table 4.14: Predicted probabilities for political orientation on policy support 
 
Policy support 
 
Left=0 
 
Right=1 
 
0 .8 % 18.4 % 
.5 18.5 % 69.2% 
1 80.7 % 12.3 % 
 
Table 4.14 shows the predicted probabilities for political orientation on all three values of 
policy support. The predicted probabilities for the far left value is furthest away from the 
general public for the middle value of policy (.5), wanting to produce as much oil as currently. 
For increase in oil production (0), the predicted probability for the far right value stands the 
most out from the general distribution. The largest variance of about 68 percentage points is 
found for the highest value (1) of less oil. The difference in predicted probabilities between 
the lowest and highest values on political orientation ranges from 17.6 to 68.4 percentage 
points, explaining a lot of the variance.  
 
Table 4.15: Predicted probabilities for trust in scientists on policy support 
 
Policy support 
 
Trust in scientists=0 
 
Trust in scientists=1 
 
0 9.2 % 3.2 % 
.5 66.9 % 47.6% 
1 23.9 % 49.2 % 
 
Table 4.15 shows the predicted probabilities for trust in scientists on all three values of policy 
support. This illustrates how the ranges of the predicted probabilities are smaller for trust in 
scientists than for political orientation on all three outcomes of policy support. The largest 
variance of about 25 percentage points is found for a decrease in oil production (1). The 
respondents who trust scientists have a predicted probability that lies closer to the statistics for 
all three values of policy support. Thus, respondents who do not trust scientists are the ones 
who explain the most of the variance. The difference in predicted probabilities between the 
lowest and highest values on trust in scientists ranges from 6 to 25.3 percentage points, 
explaining a good deal of the variance. However, it is clear that political orientation explains 
more of policy support, than does trust in scientists. 
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5 Discussion 
In this chapter, I will discuss the results outlined in the former chapter and compare the effects 
on the different dependent variables. The hypotheses formed in chapter 2 will be answered 
based on the results. Lastly, I will draw conclusions to the thesis, and discuss impacts of my 
thesis through contributions and future research. 
 
5.1 Comparing the results of the dependent variables 
The aim of my thesis is not only to analyse the effects of the independent variables on climate 
change attitudes, but also to discuss and compare different aspects of climate change attitudes, 
which are measured as six dependent variables divided into two dimensions. Each dependent 
variable was measured in independent regression models in the previous chapter. Because the 
dependent variables differ in the number and composition of respondents, as well as in 
regards to outcomes, the six regression models can only be compared through the direction 
and significance of the effects of the independent variables, and not on model estimations. 
However, the predicted probabilities for the two main independent variables, trust in scientists 
and political orientation, on the dependent variables have been presented. Through the 
predicted probabilities, I am able to discuss which of the two independent variables explain 
the most of the variance on each dependent variable. 
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Table 5.1: Results of influences of trust in scientists and political orientation 
  
Trust in scientists 
 
Political orientation 
 
Trend acceptance X7  
Attribution acceptance X X 
Overall threat perception X X 
Personal threat perception X8 X 
Efficacy belief X X 
Policy support X X 
 
Table 5.1 illustrates the main findings from the regression analyses.9 The expectation, as 
illustrated in table 2.1 in the theoretical framework, was that trust in scientists would be the 
main explanatory factor in the first dimension consisting of trend, attribution, and overall 
threat. These dependent variables are closely connected to the scientific knowledge as 
expressed through the IPCC. On the other hand, I expected that political orientation would 
have the strongest explanatory power on the second dimension including personal threat, 
efficacy and policy. These dependent variables concern more political aspects of climate 
change. However, as shown in table 5.1, the results are not consistent with the expectations. 
There is no clear division between the first three variables and the last three variables in the 
table.  
 
Trust in scientists had a significant positive effect on trend acceptance in a one-tailed test. 
Political orientation did not have a significant effect. Nor did the socioeconomic variables, 
except for income. This was however, not as surprising after presenting the descriptive 
statistics in chapter 3 which indicated that 92 per cent of the respondents believe that the 
climate is changing. Thus, there is little variance to be explained, and the few eight per cent 
who are uncertain or deny it, might be coincidental.  
                                                
7 Significant only in a one-tailed test 
8 Significant only in a one-tailed test 
9 To strengthen the robustness of the results, the ordinal variables have also been tested through ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression. The effects of the main independent variables, trust in scientists and political 
orientation, are consistent with the logistic regressions. 
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Both trust in scientists and political orientation had significant effects on attribution 
acceptance. Trust in scientists had a positive effect on accepting attribution, while political 
orientation towards the right had a negative effect. The Wald chi-square tests indicated that 
the political variables explained more than the trust variable. The predicted probabilities 
showed that both trust in scientists and political orientation explained a lot of the variance on 
attribution acceptance. However, political orientation explained the most of the two 
explanatory factors.  
 
Also for overall threat perception, the two independent variables had significant effects. The 
effect of trust in scientists is in a positive direction, while the effect of political orientation is 
negative. The Wald tests indicated that the political block explained the most of the variation. 
The predicted probabilities confirmed this, and illustrated that political orientation explains a 
lot of the variance on overall threat perception, as well as more than trust in scientists does.  
 
Political orientation had a significant negative effect on personal threat perception, while trust 
in scientists had a positive significant effect in a one-tailed test. The predicted probabilities 
illustrated the effects and showed that political orientation explains some of the variance on 
personal threat perception. However, the probabilities varied only about half the percentage 
points compared to political orientation on overall threat perception, which has the same 
outcomes.  
 
Both political orientation and trust in scientists had significant effects on efficacy belief. 
Political orientation towards the right has a negative effect, while trust in scientists has a 
positive effect. The political block seems to explain the most according to the Wald test, but 
the difference in the chi-square test is small. The predicted probabilities show that both 
variables explain parts of the variance of efficacy belief. The percentage points between the 
predicted probabilities of the smallest and largest values are a little larger for trust in scientists 
than political orientation, but with such small margins that it is difficult to say which actually 
explain the most of the variance. What can be said though, is that both trust in scientists and 
political orientation explain some of the variance of efficacy belief. 
 
For policy support, political orientation and trust in scientists both had significant effects. The 
effect of political orientation towards the right is negative, while trust in scientists has a 
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positive effect. The Wald tests indicated that the political block explains a lot more than the 
science block. Illustrating the predicted probabilities confirmed this. The variance between the 
predicted probabilities on the lowest and highest values was more than double for political 
orientation, compared to trust in scientists. Hence, political orientation and trust in scientists 
both have effects on policy support, but political orientation has the largest explanatory 
power. 
 
There is no clear division between the two dimensions. Trust in scientists has significant 
positive effects on all six climate change attitudes, and political orientation has a significant 
negative effect on all, except for trend. Political orientation seems to have more explanatory 
power than trust in scientists on four of the dependent variables, distributed in both 
dimensions. It thus seems that climate change attitudes are not explained by dividing aspects 
into dimensions. This finding suggests that it is possible that other explanations than those I 
have analysed need to be considered. It seems as ideological predispositions run so deep that 
they even interfere in receiving information and accepting science. The nature of the problem 
of climate change may play a part here. Climate change is a collective problem, thus it is 
plausible that individualistic values are not compatible in dealing with the problem. Maybe 
individualists, who place themselves to the right on the political scale, tend to not accept 
climate change and not perceive it as serious, and thus do not think of doing anything about it, 
because it is not seen as a individual problem. Maybe collectivists are more likely to accept 
climate change and perceive it as a serious problem, and thus think of doing something about 
it, because they are more likely to view it as a collective problem.  
 
In addition to political orientation, which had a significant effect on all dependent variables 
except for trend acceptance, FrP vote had a significant negative effect on attribution 
acceptance and personal threat perception. This indicates that even when controlling for 
individualistic attitudes and the placement to the right, voting for FrP has a negative effect on 
accepting anthropogenic climate change and believing that climate change is a serious 
personal threat.  
 
Oil and gas employment had a significant negative effect on overall threat perception, 
efficacy belief and policy support. Being of older age only has a significant positive effect on 
policy. Being female has a significant positive effect on all climate change attitude variables 
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except from trend and overall threat. Having higher education has significant positive effects 
on all climate change attitude variables except from trend and efficacy. Income has a 
significant effect only on trend and personal threat. The direction varies with a negative effect 
on trend, but a positive effect on personal threat.  
 
5.2 Answering the hypotheses 
In this section I will answer each of the hypotheses in light of the results. The first hypotheses 
concern the two main independent variables and their general effect on climate change 
attitudes. The following hypotheses concern the division of the dependent variables into two 
dimensions and compare and compete the effects of the two independent variables. 
 
H1: Trust in scientists has a positive effect on climate change attitudes 
 
In the literature, trust in scientists has been argued to be an important explanation for risk 
perception and climate change acceptance (Kellstedt et al., 2008; Krosnick et al., 2006; Mayer 
et al., 2013; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003). Krosnick et al. (2006) argue that people who have 
minimal trust in scientists, the primary informants about climate change, are not persuaded by 
information provided by scientists, but instead derive their opinions simply from their 
personal experiences. Among people who have more trust in scientists, exposure to new 
information should increase belief in the existence of climate change. Thus, trust should play 
an important role when information about climate change is increasing and improving.  
 
The results in this thesis support the assumption of the importance of trust in scientists on 
climate change attitudes to some degree. Trust in scientists had a significant positive effect on 
trend acceptance, attribution acceptance, overall threat perception, personal threat perception, 
efficacy belief and policy support. The results support the hypotheses H1: trust in scientists 
has a positive effect on climate change attitudes. 
 
H2: Political orientation towards the right has a negative effect on climate change attitudes 
 
Previous research has emphasized the importance of political orientation in forming climate 
change attitudes (Austgulen & Stø, 2013; Bohr, 2014; Corner, 2012; Dunlap & McCright, 
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2008; Hamilton, 2011; Kellstedt et al., 2008; Zia & Todd, 2010). According to Wood and 
Vedlitz (2007:556), “people process information about issues through a filter containing a 
range of variables relating to their predispositions” when they have limited knowledge of an 
issue and are exposed to ambiguous information. One of the important predisposed variables 
is their political orientation. The fact that people have become less concerned and more 
sceptical towards climate change while the scientific evidence on climate change becomes 
stronger, make researchers look to differences in worldview as an explanation of public 
opinion on climate change (Austgulen & Stø, 2013). The left-right dimension is a way to 
measure world view (Kellstedt et al., 2008). Individualistic values have been found to 
influence climate change opinion with more scepticism. According to Corner (2012), people 
with individualistic values dislike political interference in decision-making, and are more 
prone to be sceptical towards climate change. People with individualistic values typically 
place themselves to the right, while people who place themselves to the left have more 
collective values. Previous research has found that conservative respondents are more 
sceptical towards climate change than others (Dunlap & McCright, 2008; Eurobarometer, 
2009; McCright & Dunlap, 2011a, 2011b; Whitmarsh, 2011; Zia & Todd, 2010). Thus, the 
expectation was that political orientation towards the right has a negative effect on climate 
change attitudes.  
 
The results in this thesis support the assumption of the importance of political orientation. 
Political orientation had a significant effect on all dependent variables, except for trend 
acceptance. Hence, political orientation towards the right has a significant negative effect on 
attribution acceptance, overall threat perception, personal threat perception, efficacy belief, 
and policy support in Norway. There was no significant effect of trust in scientists on trend 
acceptance. However, the descriptive statistics showed that trend acceptance is very high in 
Norway, which means that there is little variance to be explained. Overall, the results support 
the hypotheses H2: political orientation towards the right has a positive effect on climate 
change attitudes. 
 
H3: Trust in scientists is more important for explaining the scientific related aspects of 
climate change attitudes, than political orientation 
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Because scientific related aspects of climate change are more related to information and 
communication, trust in scientists should be more important in explaining climate change 
acceptance, than political orientation. The results of this thesis contradict this assumption. For 
both attribution acceptance and overall threat perception, political orientation explains more 
than trust in scientists does. Trust in scientists explains trend acceptance, while political 
orientation does not. However, the small variance of trend leads to small effects. It can be 
concluded that the first dimension is mostly explained by political orientation. The results do 
not support H3.  
 
H4: Political orientation is more important for explaining the political related aspects of 
climate change attitudes, than trust in scientists 
 
Because the political related aspects are more individually assessed and not grounded in 
science, political orientation should be more important in explaining political climate change 
attitude, than trust in scientists. The results of this analysis are consistent with this 
assumption. Political orientation explains more than trust in scientists for personal threat 
perception and policy support. However, the effect of political orientation and trust in 
scientists is about the same for efficacy belief. Thus efficacy belief stands out from the second 
dimension, but overall, political orientation explains the most. H4 is, at least partly, supported.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis has been to explain climate change attitudes in Norway, and to analyse 
whether aspects of climate change can be divided into two dimensions, one science related 
and one political related. The assumption was that science related factors should explain 
science related attitudes and political factors should explain political related attitudes. The 
analysis has been conducted with data from the NCP through logistic regression.  
 
This conclusion has two parts. First, I will summarize the most important findings on climate 
change attitudes in Norway, as well as give an answer to the general research question. 
Second, I will argue how my findings are important for the research of public opinion on 
climate change, before giving some suggestions for future research. 
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5.3.1 Dimensions of climate change attitudes 
Trend acceptance in Norway is very high, with 92 per cent believing that the climate is 
changing, and the variance is thus difficult to explain. Attribution acceptance is also high, 
though not to the same degree as trend acceptance. A majority of Norwegians, 66 per cent, 
believe that climate change is caused mostly by human action. Overall threat perception in 
Norway is somewhat high, with 24 per cent perceiving climate change as a very serious threat 
overall, and 42 per cent as serious. In Norway, personal threat perception is lower than overall 
threat perception. Only five per cent perceive climate change as a very serious personal threat 
and 20 per cent believe climate change to be a serious personal threat. Only two per cent of 
Norwegians believe it is easy to do something to prevent harmful climate change, while 32 
per cent believe it to be possible and completely realistic. When it comes to oil production, 42 
per cent think Norway should produce less oil than the country is currently producing. 
 
The literature has to a large extent discussed all aspects of climate change attitudes as if it 
were one large dimension or concept. In this thesis I have analysed six different aspects as 
individual dependent variables, as well as aiming to divide these aspects into two dimensions. 
Trend and attribution acceptance as well as overall threat have been analysed as a scientific 
related dimension, while personal threat perception, efficacy belief and policy support has 
been analysed as a political related dimension.  
 
The expectation for the first dimension was that trust in scientists should have a significant 
effect on climate change acceptance, and that the effect should be stronger than that of 
political orientation. The results are not quite as expected. Trend acceptance is explained by 
trust in scientists. Attribution acceptance and overall threat perception are explained by both 
trust in scientists and political orientation, but mostly by political orientation.  
 
The expectation for the second dimension was that political orientation should have a 
significant effect on climate change attitudes, and that the effect should be stronger than trust 
in scientists. The results are too some degree as expected. Personal threat is explained by trust 
in scientists, but mostly by political orientation. This is in accordance to the expected 
findings. Efficacy belief is explained by both political orientation and trust in scientists, but 
the effects cannot be ranked. Policy support is explained by both political orientation and trust 
in scientists, but mostly by political orientation. Thus, all three dependent variables in the 
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second dimension are explained by political orientation, and except for on efficacy belief, 
political orientation has the most explanatory power.  
 
Trust in scientists had a significant positive effect on trend acceptance, attribution acceptance, 
overall threat perception, personal threat perception, efficacy belief, and policy support in 
Norway. Political orientation towards the right had a significant negative effect on attribution 
acceptance, overall threat perception, personal threat perception, efficacy belief, and policy 
support in Norway.  
 
It is clear that trust in scientists and political orientation are important explanatory factors for 
different aspects of climate change attitudes in Norway. However, considering the general 
research question, I have not found a clear division between scientific related and political 
aspects of climate change. The results indicate that political orientation holds the largest 
explanatory power on both dimensions. These results are not as expected, and it is thus 
possible that other explanations than those I have analysed need to be considered.  
 
5.3.2 Contributions and future research 
The contribution of this thesis to public opinion on climate change has primarily been 
regarding conceptualization and division of climate change attitudes. Even though my results 
do not support the division of climate change attitudes into a scientific and a political 
dimension, it is an important step in organizing the vast issue of climate change. In addition, 
this division has shown how important political orientation is, in explaining various aspects of 
climate change attitudes.  
 
This thesis has also contributed to the small field of research on public opinion on climate 
change in Norway. For instance, the descriptive results suggest that the focus should be 
shifted past trend to attribution acceptance, because the vast majority of Norwegians believe 
that the climate is changing. In addition to the importance of political orientation and trust in 
scientists in explaining climate change attitudes, this thesis has touched upon case specific 
explanatory factors such as oil and gas employment and FrP vote. For future research on 
Norwegian climate change attitudes, it should be interesting to analyse the effect of oil and 
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gas employment more thoroughly. It should also be applicable to do more research on the 
effect of voting for FrP, an attribution sceptic party.  
 
The dependent variable measuring policy support is very specific and concerns a controversial 
and contested case-specific issue, regarding oil production. A possible future approach to 
build on this research could be to test support for different specific policy measures on climate 
change and compare the effects of explanatory factors to see whether the effects are policy 
specific or explain general support for action. 
 
With time more data from the NCP will be available, and it would be interesting to do time-
series and panel data analyses on the development and changes in climate change attitudes. It 
should also be possible to conduct a cross-country analysis, comparing climate change 
attitudes and explanations across Europe. There is some EU research, but Norway is for 
obvious reasons not included. 
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